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LIST OF PARTIES 
The plaintiffs in the proceedings before the District Court are TruGreen 
Companies and TruGreen Limited Partnership. 
All of plaintiffs' claims against defendants Jason Beck, Paul Brower, Richard 
Coffman, Alfreda Egbert, Margie Smith, Jessica Spencer, Shannon Christensen, James 
Murray, and Matt Walker were dismissed in the District Court's February 13, 2007 Order 
(R.253) (attached as Addendum C). 
All of plaintiffs' claims against defendants Jason Hiller, James Clogston, Rick 
Deerfield, David Van Acker, and Tammy Roehr were dismissed in the District Court's 
June 8, 2007 Order (R.286) (attached as Addendum D). 
Thus, the remaining defendants who are the Respondents for purposes of this 
appeal include only the following: Kevin D. Bitton, Jean Robert Babilis, Mower 
Brothers, Inc., Greensides, LLC, Ryan Mantz, Lary Gaythwaite, Jim LeBlanc, and David 
Stevenson. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court pursuant to the Court's Order of Acceptance, 
granting in part the United States District Court's Order Certifying Questions of Law to 
the Utah Supreme Court. (Copies of the Order of Acceptance and the Order Certifying 
Questions of Law are included as Addenda A and B, respectively.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Pursuant to the Order of Acceptance, the two issues presented are: 
1. Whether under Utah law a former employer is entitled to an award of lost 
profits damages, or instead an award of restitution or unjust enrichment damages, where a 
former employee has breached contractual noncompetition, nondisclosure, and employee 
nonsolicitation provisions? 
2. Whether Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for 
tortious interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The two questions certified by the District Court are questions of state law. "On 
certification, we 'answer the legal questions presented' without 'resolving the underlying 
dispute.'" In re Kunz, 2004 UT 71,1 6, 99 P.3d 793 (quoting Spackman ex rel 
Spackman v. Board ofEduc, 2000 UT 87, % 1 n.2, 16 P.3d 533). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
No statutory or constitutional provisions are determinative of this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the 
United States District Court, 
This action was commenced by Petitioners TruGreen Companies and TruGreen 
Limited Partnership (collectively "TruGreen") in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah. R.l.1 TruGreen sued Kevin D. Bitton, Jean Robert Babilis, Mower 
Brothers, Inc. ("Mower Brothers") (a company owned by Bitton and in which Babilis is 
involved), and Greensides, LLC ("Greensides") (a former owner of Mower Brothers' 
Idaho franchise) (collectively the "Mower Brothers Defendants"). Mower Brothers owns 
Scotts Lawn Service ("SLS") franchises in Utah, Idaho, and Oregon, through which 
Mower Brothers provides lawn, tree and shrub fertilization services to consumers. 
Mower Brothers and TruGreen are direct competitors. R.184ativ-v. 
TruGreen named as additional defendants several former TruGreen employees 
who were hired by Mower Brothers: Ryan Mantz, Lary Gaythwaite, Jim LeBlanc, David 
Stevenson, Jason Hiller, James Clogston, Rick Deerfield, David Van Acker, Tammy 
Roehr, Jason Beck, Paul Brower, Richard Coffman, Alfreda Egbert, Margie Smith, 
Jessica Spencer, Shannon Christensen, James Murray, and Matt Walker. R.l 15. These 
individuals had served in such positions for TruGreen as customer service representative, 
auditor, technician, sales representative, or service manager. R.l84 at vi, xiv-xvii. 
References to the record are designated as R. (e.g., R.l). The record number 
refers to the document number of the document being referenced as reflected in the 
federal district court's docket report for this case. 
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TruGreen claimed that the Mower Brothers Defendants tortiously interfered with 
TruGreen's employee and customer contracts and relations, and claimed that each of the 
former employees it sued tortiously interfered with TruGreen's relations with customers 
and employees, and also breached various provisions in their employment agreements. 
Defendants dispute TruGreen's allegations. 
TruGreen sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to 
enjoin its former employees from working for Mower Brothers, and to enjoin Mower 
Brothers from employing them. The District Court denied both motions after expedited 
discovery, briefing, and oral argument. R.14, 112. 
TruGreen and defendants later filed cross motions for summary judgment on most 
of the issues raised in the parties' pleadings. In an Order dated February 13, 2007 
(attached as Addendum C), the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of all 
of the former employee defendants on TruGreen's tortious interference claims, in favor 
of a number of former employee defendants on TruGreen's various contract claims, and 
in favor of all defendants on TruGreen's punitive damages claims. R.253. The District 
Court dismissed completely all of TruGreen's claims against Jason Beck, Paul Brower, 
Richard Coffman, Alfreda Egbert, Margie Smith, Jessica Spencer, Shannon Christensen, 
James Murray, and Matt Walker. R.253. The February 13, 2007 Order also rejected 
TruGreen's motion for summary judgment. What remained for trial after summary 
judgment is a few contract claims against a few former employee defendants, and 
TruGreen's tortious interference claims against the Mower Brothers Defendants. 
SLC 127638 
3 
After entry of summary judgment in defendants' favor and prior to certifying 
questions to this Court, the District Court made various rulings regarding damages 
experts. TruGreen had designated F. Wayne Elggren, Mitch Smith, and David Armitage 
as expert witnesses. R. 167. Rather than contend that TruGreen had suffered lost profits 
as a result of alleged breaches of contract or tortious interference, Elggren opined that 
TruGreen's damages were Mower Brothers' gross revenues. R.169 at 4-8; 253 at 37-38. 
Defendants moved to strike Elggren's report and moved to preclude him from testifying 
at trial on the ground that Elggren's conclusions and opinions were not sufficiently 
reliable under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. R.202; 205 at 9-12; 253 at 37. 
In its February 13, 2007 Order, the District Court granted defendants' motion to 
exclude Elggren under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993), 
and Rule 702, concluding that Elggren had based his conclusions on assumptions not 
supported by facts in the record, and failed to consider many factors for a proper 
assessment of damages. R.253 at 35-43. Specifically, the District Court concluded that 
Elggren's report "does not seriously contend with potentially confounding causes of 
revenue gains and losses," and addresses none of the undisputed factors that would have 
to be taken into account in developing such a damages calculation: 
a. The specific items of confidential information that allegedly 
were taken by each Defendant who previously worked for TruGreen, 
including the impact that the use of each specific element of the 
confidential information could have on alleged damage elements including 
sales, profits, margins, expenses, and management efficiencies. 
b. Historical patterns of financial performance by TruGreen and 
how performance allegedly was impacted by the Defendants' alleged acts. 
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c. Identification of which customers TruGreen allegedly lost to 
Mower Brothers as a result of the actions of the Defendants, or which 
customers allegedly were obtained by Mower Brothers as a result of 
allegedly using TruGreen's confidential information, utilizing the customer 
databases from both TruGreen and Mower Brothers. 
d. Analysis that would show that but for the actions of the 
Defendants, TruGreen would have obtained the revenues obtained by 
Mower Brothers. 
e. The dates that each defendant quit TruGreen and/or their 
subsequent hire date at Mower Brothers and the impact each Defendant 
allegedly caused to damages. 
f. The effect of TruGreen's Ogden location closing and its 
impact on both Defendants' decision to leave TruGreen and damages 
allegedly resulting therefrom. 
g. Alternative reasons for TruGreen's decreased sales and 
profitability in 2006, including levels of advertising, weather, regional 
economic factors, population growth, publicity, market acceptance of 
products and services, business life cycle issues, pricing differences, 
competitive forces, quality of products and customer services, and 
management decisions. 
h. Alternative reasons for Mower Brothers' increased sales and 
profitability in 2006, including levels of advertising, weather, regional 
economic factors, population growth, publicity, market acceptance of 
products and services, business life cycle issues, pricing differences, 
competitive forces, quality of products and customer services, and 
management decisions. 
i. Alternative reasons as to why Mower Brothers was able to 
retain customers in 2006 that it obtained in 2005 other than by using 
confidential information from defendants, including levels of advertising, 
weather, regional economic factors, population growth, publicity, market 
acceptance of products and services, business life cycle issues, pricing 
differences, competitive forces, quality of products and customer services, 
and management decisions. 
R.253 at 39-40. Based on these failures, the District Court concluded that Mr. Elggren's 
report was unreliable and should be stricken and excluded. 
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After making its ruling regarding Elggren, the District Court directed the parties to 
provide additional briefing on the impact of the District Court's striking of Elggren's 
expert report on damages and the exclusion of his damages testimony at trial. R.253 at 
43, 44. Defendants filed damages memoranda arguing that given the lack of any 
evidence that TruGreen had suffered lost profits or other actual damages resulting from 
defendants' conduct, summary judgment should be granted in favor of defendants on the 
remaining claims against them. R.256, 261. 
TruGreen filed its own damages memoranda, claiming that it was entitled to 
recover on its breach of contract and tortious interference claims under an "unjust 
enrichment" theory of damages based solely on defendants' alleged gains—as an 
alternative to its failed attempt to prove any lost profits. R.255, 263, 286. TruGreen did 
not assert that its former employees' actual earnings with Mower Brothers or Mower 
Brothers' own gains served as a proxy to show its own lost profits, but instead claimed 
that it was entitled to complete disgorgement of all revenue earned by Mower Brothers, 
including revenue obtained from the customers who did business with Mower Brothers 
before it hired former TruGreen employees, and even revenue from customers who had 
never done business with TruGreen. R.263 at 12-14. 
Considering the parties' damages briefing, the District Court entered a June 8, 
2007 Order (attached as Addendum D) providing additional summary judgment rulings 
in defendants' favor. R.286. In the June 8 Order, the District Court ruled that "TruGreen 
has failed to provide the District Court with evidence that would raise a reasonable 
inference supporting causation and damages" and that "TruGreen has failed to provide 
6 
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any admissible evidence that shows a causal connection between TruGreen's alleged 
damages and the alleged wrongful conduct of the Defendants." R.286 at 8. In fact, as the 
District Court stated, "TruGreen has failed to produce any evidence of what damage to 
TruGreen is attributable to any of the Defendants." R.286 at 8. 
This Order granted summary judgment in favor of all claims against TruGreen's 
former employees who worked in Idaho—Jason Hiller, James Clogston, Rick Deerfield, 
David Van Acker, and Tammy Roehr. R.286 at 13. The District Court determined that 
under applicable Idaho law, the proper measure of damages for the claims at issue is lost 
profits caused by those defendants—and not the "restitutionary measure of damages" 
proposed by TruGreen. Since TruGreen offered no evidence that any alleged lost profits 
were caused by these Idaho employees' alleged conduct, claims against them were 
dismissed entirely. R.286 at 10-11. 
The District Court cited Dunn v. Ward, 670 P.2d 59 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983), a case 
for breach of a covenant not to compete, in which the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a 
"plaintiff must prove that he was injured by the breach and show the amount of damage 
caused to him. The measure of damages is not the amount of profits made by the 
defendant, rather it is the amount of profit lost to the plaintiff because of the breach." Id 
at 61; R.286 at 10. The District Court also cited Nora v. Safeco Ins. Co., 557 P.2d 347 
The June 8, 2007 Order also denied a motion of TruGreen to reconsider the 
rulings regarding Elggren, and granted defendants' motion to exclude the damages expert 
testimony of Mitch Smith, which established that Smith lacked personal knowledge of 
facts sufficient to calculate or formulate a reliable opinion regarding damages purportedly 
suffered by TruGreen. R.267, 268, 270, 286. 
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(Idaho 1978), a tortious interference case supporting a lost profits theory, in which the 
Idaho Supreme Court noted that "in cases of tortious interference with an established 
business that damages for loss of anticipated earnings or profits must be shown with 
reasonable certainty." Id. 
With respect to the remaining claim of tortious interference against the Mower 
Brothers Defendants and the contract claims against the Utah-based former TruGreen 
employee defendants remaining in the case—Mantz, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, and 
Stevenson—the District Court determined that no Utah court has opined regarding the 
proper measure of damages for tortious interference with contractual and economic 
relationships or for breach of noncompetition, nondisclosure, and employee 
nonsolicitation provisions in an employment agreement. 
After considering proposed orders submitted by the parties (R.276-79), the District 
Court proposed two questions regarding these Utah contract and tort law issues in its 
Certification Order (attached as Addendum B.) This Court's Order of Acceptance 
followed (attached as Addendum A). 
The Certification Order also included a question regarding the meaning of 
"actual damages" as set forth in the Utah Unfair Competition Act, which this Court 
rejected by not including it in its Order of Acceptance. R.287. TruGreen's stautory 
unfair competition claim against these few remaining defendants has not been resolved. 
8 
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B. Statement of Facts 
Mower Brothers, a local company, competes with TruGreen in the lawn, tree, and 
shrub fertilization business through SLS franchises that Mower Brothers owns in Utah, 
Idaho, and Oregon. TruGreen operates similar branch offices throughout the United 
States. R.184ativ-v. 
In October, 2005, Mantz, who at the time was the manager of TruGreen5 s Ogden 
branch, called Bitton, told him that his job at TruGreen was being eliminated, and stated 
that he wanted to talk about coming to work at Mower Brothers. Mower Brothers met 
with and hired Mantz in November 2005 as the manager in Mower Brothers' Salt Lake 
branch. R.184atviii. 
Some of Mantz's friends at TruGreen called him and asked if there were jobs 
available at Mower Brothers. Mantz said they needed to contact Bitton or Babilis. R.193 
at xii-xiii. In November, 2005, Gaythwaite left TruGreen's Ogden branch, called Bitton 
inquiring about a job with Mower Brothers, and was hired as the sales manager of Mower 
Brothers' Salt Lake branch. R.184 at ix. In December 2005, LeBlanc, a salesman in 
TruGreen's Ogden branch, called Bitton about employment at Mower Brothers, and was 
hired as a salesman in its Salt Lake branch. R. 184 at ix-x. In January 2006, Stephensen 
contacted Bitton and was hired as a salesman in Mower Brothers' Ogden branch. R.184 
at v. 
Mower Brothers did not ask, direct or encourage any former TruGreen employees 
to induce or encourage other TruGreen employees to terminate their employment or go to 
work for Mower Brothers. Mower Brothers hired Mantz, LeBlanc, Stephensen and 
9 
SLC 127638 
Gaythwaite only after they contacted Mower Brothers and applied for a position. Mower 
Brothers hired them to fill available positions and further Mower Brothers' business 
interests, and not to harm TruGreen's business. R.184 at xxiv. 
In January 2006, TruGreen's counsel sent letters to Mower Brothers indicating 
that Mantz, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, and Stephensen had signed noncompete agreements 
with TruGreen, and providing copies of those agreements. Prior to this time, Mower 
Brothers had no knowledge of the terms of these agreements. R. 184 at xi-xii. 
The letters regarding Mantz and Stephensen did not state that these individuals 
were prohibited from competing with TruGreen or working for Mower Brothers. Indeed, 
the noncompete agreements of these employees did not prohibit them from competing 
with TruGreen after their employment with TruGreen ended. R. 184 at xii. For these 
reasons, Mower Brothers continued to employ Mantz as the branch manager of Mower 
Brothers' Salt Lake branch and Stephensen as a salesman in Mower Brothers' Ogden 
branch. R.184 at xii. 
The noncompete agreements that accompanied the letters regarding Gaythwaite 
and LeBlanc stated that these employees may not compete with TruGreen for one year 
and for six months, respectively, after their employment at TruGreen ends in the 
geographic area in which they were assigned duties during the last six months of their 
employment with TruGreen. Because Gaythwaite and LeBlanc had been employed in 
TruGreen's Ogden branch office during their last six months at TruGreen, and were 
working for Mower Brothers in its Salt Lake branch office, Mower Brothers understood 
that their employment did not violate their TruGreen agreements. R. 184 at xii-xiii. 
10 
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Mower Brothers later learned that LeBlanc signed a new noncompete agreement 
with TruGreen, replacing the one provided by Pearson, that did not prohibit LeBlanc 
from competing with TruGreen after his employment at TruGreen ended but only while 
he was employed at TruGreen. R. 184 at xiii. 
Mantz, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, and Stephensen did not bring with them to Mower 
Brothers any written TruGreen materials, such as customer lists or financial data. 
Moreover, Mower Brothers has not asked or allowed these former TruGreen employees 
to divulge or use any confidential information or trade secret of TruGreen, and these 
employees have not disclosed or used such information. Indeed, these former TruGreen 
employees do not recall any specific confidential information of TruGreen that they may 
have seen or heard while employed there, and they did not use or disclose to Mower 
Brothers any such information while working for Mower Brothers. R. 184 at xi-xii. 
In any event, the various information that these former TruGreen employees may 
have received from TruGreen during their employment is not confidential or trade secret. 
R.193 at xiv-xxxiv. Moreover, Mower Brothers does not even use or allow employees to 
use sales techniques, marketing strategies, direct mail advertising strategies, pricing, 
product or equipment information, or financial information from previous employers 
because it has its own materials deployed to all SLS franchisees. R.184 at xi-xii. 
Mower Brothers has not asked, directed, or encouraged these four former 
TruGreen employees to contact individuals known to them to be TruGreen customers to 
solicit their business for Mower Brothers. Mantz, LeBlanc, Stephensen and Gaythwaite 
have not contacted any person known to them to be a TruGreen customer since going to 
11 
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work for Mower Brothers for the purpose of soliciting the person's business for Mower 
Brothers. Mower Brothers has not targeted TruGreen's customers in its advertising or 
otherwise sought to solicit business specifically from TruGreen customers. Mower 
Brothers has no knowledge of the identity of TruGreen's customers. R.184 at xxiii. 
Mower Brothers markets its services and products through direct mail advertising 
purchased from SLS. The name and address of the mail recipients come from mail lists 
purchased by SLS from national list companies. When a mail recipient contacts Mower 
Brothers by return postcard or telephone to inquire about SLS's products and services, 
the postcard or call is forwarded randomly to a sales representative who responds to the 
potential customer, answers their questions and attempts to sell them products or services. 
Mower Brothers does not attempt to learn the identity of, or target, their competitors' 
customers in order to contact them to solicit their business. R.184 at v-vi. 4 
Any coincidental contact that Mower Brothers' sales reps may have had with 
current or former customers of TruGreen was not done with an improper purpose or by 
improper means. R.253 at 2, 22-31. 
Defendants' expert, Derk Rasmussen, performed an exhaustive analysis of 
TruGreen's customer database (with its 423,590 names) and Mower Brothers' (with its 
165,158 names) to determine which customers switched from TruGreen to Mower 
Brothers, as well as the reasons for the switch. R.240 at ^ 201-25. The data revealed 
that 2447 names contained in TruGreen's data base became customers of Mower 
Brothers after TruGreen employees were hired. R.240 at |^ 204. Of this number, only 57 
had interactions with the same employee at both TruGreen and Mower Brothers. R.240 
at Tf 221. Only 12 matching employees had switched from TruGreen to Mower Brothers 
within one year from their last service at TruGreen, had cancel comments that showed 
they left TruGreen for reasons unrelated to the Defendant Employees, and had interaction 
with the same employee at both companies. R.240 at ^[222. None of the matching 
customers met all of the cross comparison criteria. R.240 at Tf 222. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The first certified question is resolved by resorting to well-established, 
fundamental principles of contract law. Put simply, the measure of damages for breach 
of contract is the loss to the plaintiff occasioned by the breach. Notions of restitution or 
unjust enrichment have no place in an action for contract damages. Here, the damages to 
TruGreen for breach of the various employment agreement covenants would be limited to 
lost profits or other similar damage to TruGreen that was caused by its former 
employees' alleged breaches. There is no authority in Utah for awarding in such breach 
of contract cases the earnings of the former employees or the revenues or profits of their 
new employer (which is what TruGreen now seeks). Moreover, the case law is 
overwhelming from other jurisdictions that for breaches of contract provisions similar to 
those before the Court, damages are measured by the employer's loss and not the 
employee's gain. Considering these authorities, the Court should answer the first 
certified question by holding that Utah does not recognize an unjust enrichment or 
restitutionary measure of damages for breaches of employment agreements. 
The second certified question is resolved by this Court's examination of the law of 
torts generally and tortious interference specifically. This Court has held—as have other 
courts interpreting Utah law and the law of a large majority of other states—that the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover its loss actually and proximately caused by the defendant's 
tortious interference, and not restitution or unjust enrichment. Considering this authority, 
the second certified question—whether Utah recognizes restitution or unjust enrichment 
as a remedy for tortious interference—should be resolved in the negative. 
13 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN UTAH FOR BREACH OF 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS IS THE EMPLOYER'S ACTUAL LOST 
PROFITS RESULTING FROM THE BREACH. 
The first certified question is answered by basic principles of contract law. While 
there may be little authority from this Court detailing the standards for measuring 
damages for breach of the particular employment agreement provisions before the Court 
in this case, there is no basis for casting aside the fundamental notion that contractual 
remedies center on the nonbreaching party's loss, and not the breaching party's gain. 
Moreover, even looking to other jurisdictions specifically addressing similar contract 
language, the authority is overwhelming that an employer's damages are based on the 
employer's own losses caused by the breach, and not the ex-employee's gain. Based on 
this authority, the Court should answer the first certified question by holding that an 
employer's damages for breach of contract consist of its lost profits resulting from the 
breach, and not some restitutionary or unjust enrichment measure of damages centered 
solely on the breaching party's gain. 
A, Contract Damages Center on the Nonbreaching Party's Lost 
Expectation Interest 
It is well established in Utah that the proper measure of damages for breach of 
contract generally is "the lost fruits of [the] contract" for the nonbreaching party, Baugh 
v. Barley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335, 338-39 (1947), also referred to as the nonbreaching 
party's "expectation interest" occasioned by the breach. Ford v. American Express Fin. 
Advisors, Inc., 2004 UT 70, \ 39, 98 P.3d 15. Awarding the expectancy interest serves 
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the role of contract damages of placing the nonbreaching party in as good a position as if 
the contract were performed. Ford, 2004 UT 70 atf 39. The nonbreaching party's 
expectation interest is measured by: 
"(a) the loss in value to him of the other party's performance 
caused by its failure or deficiency, plus 
(b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, 
caused by the breach, less 
(c) any cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to 
perform." 
Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347); see also Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 344(a) (1981) (defining "expectation interest" as nonbreaching party's 
"interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he 
would have been in had the contract been performed"). 
Contract damages are based on the plaintiffs actual loss caused by the breach so 
as to "avoid putting the plaintiff in a better position than he would have occupied but for 
the breach." Id. at J^ 37 ("[Compensatory damages exist simply to make the plaintiff 
whole by compensating the plaintiff for injuries actually sustained."); see also 
Anesthesiologists Assocs. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 884 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Utah 1994) 
(stating that contract damages seek to "to place the nonbreaching party in as good a 
position as if the contract had been performed" and not punish breaching party).5 These 
5
 This black-letter rule in Utah for computing contract damages is the same in 
other jurisdictions, which generally recognize that the Court should look to the 
nonbreaching party's losses, and not the breaching party's gains, in seeking to place the 
nonbreaching party in the position it would have been in had the contract been 
performed. See, e.g., American Air Filter Co. v. McNichol, 527 F.2d 1297, 1300 (3d Cir. 
15 
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authorities, standing alone, are sufficient to resolve the first certified question and 
conclude that TruGreen would be entitled to recover only its actual losses caused by the 
alleged contract breaches in this case. 
B, Unjust Enrichment or Restitution Are Not Proper Measures of 
Damages for Breach of Contract. 
"Unjust enrichment" or "restitution" is not the proper measure of damages for 
breach of contract under Utah law. The remedy of restitution is only available for a 
quantum meruit or unjust enrichment claim, where in the absence of an express contract a 
contract is implied at law to prevent unjust enrichment at the plaintiffs expense.6 See 
Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The measure of recovery for 
unjust enrichment is the value of the benefit conferred on the defendant (the defendant's 
1975) ("The basic failing of the plaintiffs theory is that the defendant's profits are not 
necessarily equivalent to the plaintiffs losses. The defendant's profit margin may be 
higher than plaintiffs for any number of reasons—e.g., product more efficiently made or 
distributed. To compel defendant to disgorge these profits could give plaintiff a windfall 
and penalize the defendant, neither of which serves the purpose of contract damages."); 
Dunn v. Ward, 670 P.2d 59, 61 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983) ("The measure of damages [for 
breach of noncompetition agreement] is not the amount of profits made by the defendant, 
rather it is the amount of profit lost to the plaintiff because of the breach. . . . However, 
the profits which a defendant realized in violation of his agreement may be considered, in 
evidence, if shown to correspond, in whole or in part, with the loss of plaintiff."); D. W. 
Trowbridge Ford, Inc. v. Galyen, 262 N.W.2d 442, 446 (Neb. 1978) ("[Tjhe measure of 
damages, expressed generally, is the value of the business lost to the plaintiff—not the 
gain of defendant, which may be more or less than plaintiffs loss."); Axford v. Price, 61 
S.E.2d 637, 642 (W. Va. 1993) (refusing to allow defendant's profits to be measure of 
damages for breach of noncompetition agreement because "defendant may upon 
reengaging in business by reason of his superior skill and experience make a profit 
greater than the loss suffered by plaintiff). 
6
 A second branch of quantum meruit is a contract implied-in-fact, where a 
"contract" is established by conduct. See Davies, 746 P.2d at 269; Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 5 cmt. a (1981). This branch of quantum meruit has no application in this 
case where there is an express contract between TruGreen and its former employees. 
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gain) and not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff, or necessarily the reasonable value 
of the plaintiffs services. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
In the American Towers case, this Court explained the inapplicability of unjust 
enrichment or restitution to contract actions, explaining that the restitutionary remedy for 
unjust enrichment "is designed to provide an equitable remedy where one does not exist 
at law." American Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. CCIMechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 
1192-93 (Utah 1996). As a result, "if a legal remedy is available, such as breach of an 
express contract, the law will not imply the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment." Id. 
at 1193; see also Mann v. American W. Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1978) 
("The restitution claim asserted by Mann is easily put to rest. Recovery in quasi contract 
is not available where there is an express contract covering the subject matter of the 
litigation."); Davies, 746 P.2d at 1373 n.8 (holding that doctrine of unjust enrichment and 
remedy of restitution associated with that claim are inapplicable in case for breach of 
express contract because recovery under unjust enrichment "presupposes that no 
enforceable written or oral contract exists"). 
The Restatement recognizes a contract remedy known as "restitution," but this 
remedy does not apply here for multiple reasons. First, the remedy of restitution outlined 
in the Restatement is not the breaching party's gains (which TruGreen seeks), but simply 
the restoration of a particular benefit that one party had conferred on the other party to the 
contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344(c) (1981) (defining "restitution 
interest" as nonbreaching party's "interest in having restored to him any benefit that he 
has conferred on the other party."). Second, this remedy is limited to rescission or other 
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cases in which a contract fails but benefits have been conferred upon another party, 
which is not the case here. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 373-77 (1981) 
(outlining various scenarios involving material failure of contract in which restitution is 
provided). 
Third, alternatively, rescission—and the restitutionary remedy that follows—must 
be elected in a timely fashion in lieu of damages—and TruGreen elected damages here. 
R.115 (Amended Complaint) at 31-32. See Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 
P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 1983) (doctrine of election of remedies requires election of either 
damages or rescission). Finally, the timely election of rescission presupposes that the 
plaintiff can return what it received under the contract, which in this case would involve a 
return to its former employees of the value of their services performed under their 
O 
employment agreements—which TruGreen has never offered and likely will not offer. 
7
 See also Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979) ("As a 
general proposition, a party to a contract has a right of rescission and an action for 
restitution as an alternative to an action for damages where there has been a material 
breach of the contract by the other party.") (citing 12 Williston on Contracts § 1455 (3d 
ed.)); Brandtjen & Kluge v. Shonka, 2 Utah 2d 223, 272 P.2d 155, 156-57 (1954) ("'The 
effect of rescission of an agreement is to put the parties back in the same position they 
were in prior to the making of the contract. . . . After rescission for a breach, there is no 
right to damages for such breach. The party rescinding may, however, have a right to 
restitution with respect to any performance on his part.'") (citing Am. Jur.)\ Sidney 
Stevens Implement Co. v. Hintze, 92 Utah 264, 67 P.2d 632, 638 (1937) (restitution 
appropriate "'instead of compensation'" if rescission elected). 
8
 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 384(1) (1981) ("[A] party will not be 
granted restitution unless (a) he returns or offers to return, conditional on restitution, any 
interest in property that he has received in exchange in substantially as good condition as 
when it was received by him, or (b) the court can assure such return in connection with 
the relief granted."); Anderson v. Doms, 2003 UT App 241, H 11, 75 P.3d 925 (rescission 
entails return to status quo existing before formation of contract). 
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In sum, under Utah law, unjust enrichment is an equitable claim that has no place 
in this action for breach of contract. And, since this is not a rescission case, the 
contractual remedy of restitution is inappropriate for the alleged contractual breaches. 
C. TruGreen's Actual Loss—if Any—Is the Proper Measure of Damages 
for the Contract Breaches Alleged Here by TruGreen. 
There is no need for any different measure of contract damages for the particular 
breaches of employment agreements alleged by TruGreen in this case. As detailed 
above, Utah law awards the plaintiffs loss for breach of contract and, in an action for 
contract damages, this Court does not recognize remedies of unjust enrichment and 
restitution. These standards do not change in an employment contract. Indeed, as 
detailed below, the overwhelming authority is that an ex-employee is liable for nothing 
more than the employer's lost profits for breach of an employment agreement. 
1. The Employer's Lost Profits Are the Measure of Damages for 
Breach of a Covenant Not to Compete. 
TruGreen is limited to lost profits on its claim that former employees breached 
contractual covenants not to compete. TruGreen cannot resort to the equitable remedy of 
unjust enrichment in this contract case and thereby measure damages by its ex-employees 
alleged gains. Although this Court has not dealt with this issue directly, in similar 
circumstances the Court has indicated that the focus for the breach of such a contract is 
the employer's losses attributable to the breach. 
In Robbins v. Findlay, 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982), the Court considered a covenant 
in an employment agreement prohibiting the ex-employee's misuse of customer leads in 
competition with the employer, and whether an accompanying liquidated damages 
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provision could be enforced. Id. at 625. After noting the standard that liquidated 
damages provisions will be enforced only "if designed to provide fair compensation for a 
breach based on a reasonable relation to actual damage/' id. at 626, the Court considered 
the employer's actual estimated lost sales revenue from its leads to determine that the 
liquidated damages provision was a "reasonable" estimate of actual damage, see id. at 
626-27. By considering solely plaintiffs potential losses in determining "actual 
damages," this Court implicitly held that the proper measure of damage for the breach of 
a noncompetition agreement is the employer's losses and not the defendant's alleged 
gains. 
This same standard, followed in the large majority of other jurisdictions, is that 
"[t]he proper measure of damages for a breach of a covenant not to compete is the non-
breaching party's losses rather than the breaching party's gains." Robert S. Weiss & 
Assoc., Inc. v. Wiederlight, 546 A.2d 216, 225-26 (Conn. 1988) (refusing to grant 
damages where only proof of damages was profits gained by former employer from 
people solicited in breach of the noncompetition provision).9 The Vermont Supreme 
Court explained the basis for this standard as follows: 
9
 See also Van Dyck Printing Co. v. DiNicola, 648 A.2d 898, 904 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 1993) ("Damages for breach of a covenant not to compete are measured by the loss 
suffered by the enforcing party."); Turbines, Inc. v. Thompson, 648 N.E.2d 254, 257 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1997) ("[A]bsent an enforceable liquidated damages clause, lost profits are a 
proper measure of damages in actions involving covenants not to compete.") (citing 
C.J.S. Damages § 79(d) ("The measure of damages for breach of a contract. . . 
restraining competition is the loss of profits sustained by the injured party.")); 
Planmatics, Inc. v. Showers, 137 F. Supp. 2d 616, 622 (W.D. Md. 2001) ("Expectancy 
damages for breach of [a noncompetition provision] generally are the profits that would 
have been recognized had no breach occurred."); Ancil v. Annerson, 227 P.2d 74, 79 
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The measure of damages for breach of a non-competition agreement is the 
plaintiffs provable loss and not the gain accruing to the defendant by 
reason of the breach. The difficulty in producing evidence in support of 
this measure of damages does not change the rule that in a contract action 
one can only recover the natural and proximate damages caused by the 
injury. Plaintiff is entitled to recover only those profits lost on sales which 
he might reasonably have made, but for the defendant's breach. 
(Idaho 1951) (damages for the breach of a noncompete provision are limited to "only the 
net profits lost by plaintiff during the period of time when defendant was obligated to 
refrain from engaging in business in competition with plaintiff."); Orkin Exterminating 
Co. v. Burnett, 160 N.W.2d 427, 429 (Iowa 1968) (damages limited to "loss naturally 
resulting from the breach"); Horizon Holdings, L.L.C. v. Genmar Holdings, Inc., 241 F. 
Supp.2d 1123, 1154 (D. Kan. 2002) (damages limited to "lost profits resulting from 
breach"); Chapman & Drake v. Harrington, 545 A.2d 645 (Me. 1988) (damages based on 
lost profits attributable to customers solicited away); National Micrographics Systems, 
Inc. v. OCE-Industries, Inc., 465 A.2d 862, 867 (Md. Ct. App. 1983) (damages limited to 
"profit that would have been realized had no breach occurred"); Clark v. Liberty Natl 
Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 564, 568 (Ala. 1992) (damages limited to value of lost contracts 
resulting from breach); Mattison v. Johnston, 730 P.2d 286, 292 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) 
(damages are "loss of income"); Dawson v. Temps Plus, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 722, 728-29 
(Ark. 1999) (no damages awarded because no evidence that customers actually left 
former employer); Tower Oil & Technology Co. v. Buckley, 425 N.E.2d 1060, 1071 (111. 
App. Ct. 1981) (limiting damages to "lost profits during the covenant period"); G.T 
Mitchell Co. v. Mckey, 599 So. 2d 355, 357 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (damages limited to "loss 
sustained and the profit for which [the employer] has been deprived"); Nicholaides v. 
Demetri, 195 N.W.2d 793, 793-94 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (damages limited to lost 
profits); Barone v. Marcisak, 465 N.Y.S.2d 561, 562 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (limiting 
damages to "loss sustained by reason of the breach, including the net profits of which the 
plaintiff was deprived by the defendant's acts"); Southtech Orthopedics, Inc. v. Dingus, 
428 F.Supp.2d 410, 418 (E.D.N.C. 2006) ("North Carolina courts routinely recognize 
monetary damages measured by lost profits as adequate to redress a breach of a covenant 
not to compete."); Premix, Inc. v. Zappitelli, 561 F. Supp. 269, 278 (D. Ohio 1983) 
(damages limited to lost profits); Baker v. Hooper, 50 S.W.3d 463, 470 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2001) (same); Riverview Floral v. Watkins, 754 P.2d 1055, 1058-59 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1988) (damages limited to lost profits, but not awarded when speculative); Wirum & 
Cash, Architects v. Cash, 837 P.2d 692, 711 (Alaska 1992) ("profits earned by the 
breaching party" not awardable unless "shown to correspond in whole or in part to 
plaintiffs loss"); National School Studios, Inc. v. Superior School Photo Service, Inc., 
242 P.2d 756, 762-63 (Wash. 1952) (holding that it was not improper for the trial court to 
refuse to admit evidence concerning defendant's profits in connection with determination 
of plaintiff s damages resulting from breach of covenant not to compete). 
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Vermont Electric Supply Co, v. Andrus, 373 A.2d 531, 532 (Vermont 1977). Thus, in 
cases where an employer relies solely on the profits allegedly obtained by a breaching ex-
employee, rather than seek to prove its own lost profits, courts routinely refuse to award 
damages. 
In Ibarra v. Missouri Poster & Sign Co,, 838 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992), for 
example, when the employer "had not attempted to calculate the company's monetary 
loss" for the breach of a noncompete by an ex-employee and instead relied solely on "the 
amount of gross sales made by the [former employee] while employed by [the new 
employer]," the court refused to award damages. Id, at 39-40. Likewise, in American Air 
Filter Co, v. McNichol, 527 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975), the court rejected damages theories 
based on gains of the ex-employee or the new employer because "a defendant's profits 
are not the measure of a contract plaintiffs losses." Id. at 1300 & n.8.10 
1U
 See also D, W, Trowbridge Ford, 262 N.W.2d at 446 ("[T]he measure of 
damages, expressed generally, is the value of the business lost to the plaintiff—not the 
gain of defendant.") (citation omitted); Lenco Pro v, Guerin, 1998 Mass. App. Div. 10, 
11 (1998) ("The damages in [an action for breach of a noncompetition agreement] are 
generally calculated as income or profits lost to the former employer. We find no case 
where damages in contract for breach of a covenant not to compete have been measured 
in any other way.") (internal citation omitted); Axford, 61 S.E.2d at 642 (holding that 
"measure of damages recoverable for the breach of a covenant of the seller of a business 
not to reengage in the business in competition with the purchaser is the value of the 
business lost by plaintiff and not the gain of defendant resulting from his breach of the 
covenant"); Dunn, 670 P.2d at 61 ("The measure of damage for the breach of an anti-
competition clause is the amount that the plaintiff lost by reason of the breach . . . . The 
measure of damages is not the amount of profits made by the defendant, rather it is the 
amount of profit lost to the plaintiff because of the breach."); DBA Enters., Inc, v, Allen, 
923 P.2d 298, 302-03 (Colo. App. 1996) (noting that other jurisdictions have held that 
damages for the breach of covenant not to compete are measured by lost profits and not 
by benefit to ex-employee; refusing to award "gross receipts" of breaching party because 
it was an "inappropriate measure" of damages). 
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The Robbins analysis—together with the general contract damages rules addressed 
in Points 1(A) and (B), above—conforms to this authority from other jurisdictions, and 
should be confirmed here by a statement that an employer's damages for an ex-
employee's breach of a covenant not to compete are the employer's lost profits. 
2. Lost Profits Are the Measure of Damages for Breach of a 
Nondisclosure Agreement. 
The measure of damages should be no different for an employer's claim for breach 
of an employee nondisclosure agreement. While this Court has never addressed this issue 
directly, lost profits are the generally recognized measure of damages in such cases in 
other jurisdictions.l x 
For example, in Rodgard Corp. v. Miner Enters., Inc., Civ. No. 84-CV-0397E(M), 
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19403, *18-*20 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1998), rather than "asserting 
claims for legal damages (i.e., plaintiffs' lost profits . . .) other than nominal damages, 
plaintiffs argued that breach of the confidentiality agreement entitled them to equitable 
relief in the form of a constructive trust and accounting for defendants' profits or, in the 
11
 See, e.g., The Toledo Group, Inc. v. Benton Indus., Inc., 623 N.E.2d 205, 211 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (finding against plaintiff on breach of confidentiality agreement 
claim where plaintiff could not show that "this breach of the confidentiality agreement 
caused any loss to [plaintiff]."); Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Can., 210 F.3d 
1,7, 16 (1st Cir. 2000) (affirming "lost profits" damages for breach of confidentiality 
agreement but denying portion of lost profits calculation); Suresource, Inc. v. Sendirect, 
LLC, CV044001671S, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 702, *22-*23 (March 14, 2005) 
(disallowing damages claim for breach of "confidentiality agreement" that included 
noncompetition and nonsolicitation provisions because plaintiff failed to show that 
defendant's actions caused "plaintiff to lose that business and suffer damages"); Edix 
Media Group, Inc. v. Mahani, Civ. No. 2186-N, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 207, *51-*57 
(Dec. 12, 2006) (noting that plaintiff was entitled to "compensatory damages" arising 
from breach of confidentiality agreements and awarding damages based on lost profits 
from contracts lost due to defendant's use of confidential information). 
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alternative, a reasonable royalty." Id. The court granted summary judgment against the 
employer because "defendant's profits" were not recoverable and plaintiff failed to show 
"that they are entitled to any damages as a result" of the breach of confidentiality 
agreements. Id. at *20, *22. 
Based on the general Utah standards for contract damages and the foregoing 
authority from other jurisdictions regarding nondisclosure agreements, the Court should 
hold that the proper measure of damages for the breach of TruGreen's nondisclosure 
agreement is the losses suffered as a result of the breach, and not restitution or unjust 
enrichment. 
3. The Employer's Lost Profits Are the Measure of Damages for 
Breach of an Employee Nonsolicitation Agreement. 
The proper measure of damages for the breach of an employee nonsolicitation 
provision is the same as for other breach of contract claims—the expectation interest 
measured by the plaintiffs lost profits. This specific contract breach has not been 
examined by this Court, but the same general contract remedy should be applied. Other 
jurisdictions follow this standard. 
12
 See e.g., Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Hitz, Civ. No. 89-2047-S, 1991 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1530, *15 (D. Kan. Jan. 24, 1991) (employer entitled to lost profits and "costs 
incurred in replacing employees who were enticed away" in violation of employee 
nonsolicitation provision); Newsouth Comms. Corp. v. Universal Telephone Co., LLC, 
Civ. No. 02-2722, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18969, *70-*71 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2002) 
(awarding damages equivalent to profits from customer lost due to solicitation away of 
plaintiffs employees in breach of contract); Western Insulation, L.P. v. Moore, Civ. No. 
3:05CV602, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 77065, *38-*39 (E.D. Va. Aug. 29, 2006) (awarding 
lost profits for breach of noncompetition and employee nonsolicitation agreement but 
refusing to award "damages for training new employees" because plaintiff failed to prove 
such damages), partially overruled, Nos. 06-2028 and 06-2075, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
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For example, in Nationscredit Corp. v. CSSI, The Support Group, Inc., Civ. No. 
05-99-01612-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 1313, *16-*20 (Mar. 21, 2002), the court was 
faced with the issue of whether a plaintiff could recover "unjust enrichment" damages for 
the breach of a nonhire provision where the plaintiff failed to prove it had lost profits due 
to the defendant's breach. The court held: 
In the present case, the jury found the non-hire provision of the . . . 
Agreement was breached, but found no lost profits. Although the jury 
awarded damages to [plaintiff] for unjust enrichment, unjust enrichment 
was an improper measure of damages for breach of contract because the 
non-hire provision in the contract was expressly stated and enforceable. 
/</. at*19. 
Likewise, in Long Beach Mortgage Co. v. Palazzo, Civ. No. G025646, 2002 Cal. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 2484, *14 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2002), the employer attempted to 
prove its damages for the breach of a noncompetition provision and an employee 
nonsolicitation provision by presenting an expert whose calculation "was nothing more 
than the simple application of [the former employer's] profit margin to [the new 
employer's] revenues." Id. The court rejected this theory—and excluded the expert— 
because there had not been a proper showing of plaintiff s actual "lost profits." Id. 
TruGreen should also be limited to its lost profits on its claim for alleged 
employee breaches of TruGreen's nonsolicitation agreement. There is no basis in Utah 
law to award restitution or unjust enrichment for such alleged breaches. 
17713, *13-*26 (4th Cir. July 25, 2007) (noting that "lost profits" are awardable for 
breach of contract but reversing trial court's award of lost profits because plaintiff failed 
to show that "but for" the defendant's actions the plaintiff would not have suffered these 
lost profits). 
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II. THE PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR TORTIOUS 
INTERFERENCE IS THE PLAINTIFF'S LOST PROFITS CAUSED BY 
THE DEFENDANT'S TORTIOUS CONDUCT. 
The Court should answer in the negative the second certified question, whether 
Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for tortious interference. 
Although this Court has not directly addressed the issue of whether "restitutionary" 
damages are recoverable in a tortious interference case, several decisions by this Court 
and the Court of Appeals have recognized and applied Section 774A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts and have confirmed that a plaintiff is entitled to recover lost profits 
from a defendant held liable for tortious interference. Utah courts are not alone. This 
same rule has been recognized in most other jurisdictions. 
A. This Court Has Recognized Lost Profits as the Measure of Damages 
for a Tortious Interference Claim. 
Several decisions by this Court confirm that the proper measure of damages in a 
tortious interference case is lost profits. See, e.g., Penelko, Inc. v. John Price Assocs., 
Inc., 642 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1982) (affirming that the proper measure of damages for 
defendant's breach of lease and tortious interference with plaintiffs movie theater 
business was plaintiffs "reduction in patronage and revenue"); Globe Leasing Corp. v. 
Bank of Salt Lake, 586 P.2d 420, 421-22 (Utah 1978) (reversing the trial court's damages 
award of $50,000 because plaintiff could not show it lost $50,000 without evidence that 
defendant's direct collection led to lost profits or that plaintiff actually had lost profits in 
that amount). 
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For example, in Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323, 
this Court decided whether a plaintiff had sufficiently established on summary judgment 
the damages supporting its tortious interference claim. The plaintiff had entered into a 
contract to purchase certain property but the contract was contingent upon plaintiff 
obtaining zoning approvals. Id. at \ 2. The defendants, opponents to plaintiffs proposed 
use of the property, represented to the seller that either they could raise sufficient funds to 
buy the property or there were other potential buyers for the property. Id. at f^ 8. Based 
on these representations, the contract for the purchase of the property expired and 
plaintiff later bought the property for an inflated amount. Id. at \ 33. This Court held 
that the damages for defendants' alleged interference with the plaintiffs economic 
relations were limited to those it incurred as a direct result of defendants' wrongful 
conduct—i.e., those damages actually attributable to the defendants' actions—namely, 
the difference in the purchase price of the property between the time of the first contract 
and the time plaintiff actually was able to make the purchase. Id. at \ 34. 
These authorities are consistent with this Court's pronouncements regarding tort 
law generally, which requires a showing of the fundamental elements of causation and 
actual injury. See, e.g., Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1987) ("Under 
traditional tort analysis, the plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty, the breach of 
which proximately causes injury to the plaintiff."); Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 2005 UT 80, \ 
9, 125 P.3d 906 (noting elements of negligence include "that the breach of duty was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, and that the plaintiff in fact suffered injuries or 
damages.") (citation omitted). Awarding unjust enrichment or restitution for tortious acts 
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would not be based on actual injury sustained by the plaintiff as an actual and proximate 
result of the defendant's tortious conduct. 
Based on these authorities, the Court can readily dispose of the second certified 
question and confirm that Utah law does not recognize unjust enrichment or restitution as 
the measure of damages for tortious interference, but instead recognizes that a prevailing 
plaintiff is entitled to recover any lost profits or other losses attributable to the tortious 
interference. 
B. Courts Interpreting Utah Law Have Expressly Held That Damages for 
Tortious Interference Are Measured by the Plaintiffs Losses, 
Other state and federal courts interpreting Utah law with respect to tortious 
interference have held that damages for tortious interference under Utah law are 
measured by the actual pecuniary losses suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the tortious 
1 O 
interference, as provided in Section 774A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See 
Damages recoverable under Section 774A are explained as follows: 
Whether the interference is with an existing contract or with a prospective 
contractual relation, one who becomes liable for it is liable for damages for 
the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or the relation. In the case 
in which a third person is prevented from performing a contract with the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff may recover for the loss of profits from the contract. 
When it is the plaintiff himself who is prevented from performance of his 
contract with a third person, he may recover for expenses to which he is put 
or for other pecuniary losses incurred in making his performance good. 
And when the defendant's interference is with prospective contractual 
relations, the plaintiff may recover for the loss of profits to be made out of 
the expected contracts. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A cmt. B. The drafters of the Restatement 
recognized that there may be occasions when it is difficult for a plaintiff to prove its lost 
profits. See id. cmt. c. Rather than allow for restitution or unjust enrichment damages in 
such circumstances, the drafters note that "when the court is convinced that damages 
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Sampson v. Richins, 110 P.2d 998, 1006-07 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (affirming damages 
award under Section 774A, stating that "one who is ultimately deemed liable to another 
for interference with economic relations is liable for 'the pecuniary loss of the benefits of 
the contract or the prospective relation; [or] consequential losses for which the 
interference is a legal cause.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 774A at 55 (1979))); Bosshard v. Wagstaff, Nos. 90-4062, 90-4068, 1991 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 16112, *5 (10th Cir. July 16, 1991) ("A person charged with interference 
with economic relations is potentially liable for the loss of benefits under the contract or 
the consequential losses for which the interference is the legal cause.") (interpreting Utah 
law); United States v. Bald Eagle Realty, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1334 (D. Utah 1998) 
(holding that remedy for tortious interference in Utah is "the pecuniary loss of the 
benefits of the contract or the prospective relation [or] consequential damages for which 
the interference is a legal cause."). 
As correctly explained in Sampson, the trial court's findings regarding damages 
"must identify actual pecuniary losses suffered by [plaintiff] as a result of [defendant's 
conduct." 770 P.2d at 1006-07. Based on these persuasive authorities, coupled with this 
Court's own rulings, the Court should resolve that restitutionary or unjust enrichment 
remedies—irrespective of the plaintiffs actual loss—are not the proper measure of 
damages for tortious interference. 
have been incurred but the amount cannot be proved with reasonable certainty, it awards 
nominal damages." Id. 
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C. Other Jurisdictions Expressly Reject Restitution or Unjust Enrichment 
Damages as the Proper Measure of Damages for Tortious Interference, 
In addition to the many jurisdictions that have adopted Section 774A of the 
Restatement and have awarded lost profits in accordance with that section,14 several 
jurisdictions have specifically held that damages for tortious interference are measured by 
See, e.g., KForce, Inc. v. Surrex Solutions Corp., 436 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 
2006) (recognizing that Missouri adopted Section 774A and noting that damages for 
tortious interference are "the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract"); KWPlastics 
v. United States Can Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (requiring proof of 
plaintiffs actual losses under Section 774A); DiLoreto v. Shumake, 38 Cal. App. 4th 35, 
38-39 (1995) (citing Section 774A as measure of damages); Innovative Financial 
Services, LLC v. Urban, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 775 (refusing to award damages for 
intentional interference with noncompete agreement where plaintiff "failed to prove its 
actual damages" and addressing damages for interference with employment contract 
under section 774A); Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 982 P.2d 945, 951-52 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (reversing damages award because plaintiff failed to prove "lost 
business profits" caused by interference with noncompetition provision); Dowd & Dowd 
Ltd .v. Gleason, 816 N.E.2d 754, 771-73 (111. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming award of lost 
profits for tortious interference claim); Burk v. Heritage Food Servs. Equip, Inc., 17fl 
N.E. 2d 803, 816-17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) ("[T]he measure of damages for wrongfully 
inducing a breach of contract is compensation for the loss incurred" and dismissing claim 
where plaintiff failed to prove losses due to interference); Rite Aid Corp v. Lake Shore 
Investors, All A.2d 735 (Md. Ct. App. 1984) (adopting section 774A and allowing award 
of "pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract."); Fowler v. Printers II, Inc., 598 A.2d 
794, 805-06 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (under section 774A and Restatement of 
Contracts (Second) § 347 (cited above)) former employer was entitled to consequential 
damages measured by lost profits for interference with an employee noncompete 
agreement); Excel Indus. Elecs. v. Blanco, No. 196899, 1998 Mich. App. LEXIS 1824, 
*4-*5 (Mich. Ct. App. June 30, 1998) (under section 774A plaintiff had failed to prove 
damages where it did not offer "evidence of a loss of net profits"); Developers Three v. 
Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 N.E.2d 1130, 1136-37 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting unjust 
enrichment damages, holding that plaintiffs lost profits rather than defendant's gains is 
the proper measure of damages) ;C//#ord Mcfarland Read & Lundy, Inc. v. Brier, 1998 
R.I. Super LEXIS 68, *29-*30 (limiting damages for tortious interference claim to lost 
profits); Lien v. Northwester Engg Co., 39 N.W.2d 483, 485-86 (S.D. 1949) (measure of 
damages is net lost profits); Dor sett Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Whitt Tile & Marble Dist. Co., 
734 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tenn. 1987) (lost profits must be measured by the loss sustained 
by plaintiffs business and not by its effect upon defendant's business). 
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the "lost profits the plaintiff business sustained as a result of the tortious interference, not 
by its effect upon the defendant's business." UZ Engineered Prods. Co. v. Midwest 
Motor Supply Co., 110 N.E.2d 1068 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (affirming award of lost profits 
for tortious interference claim).15 
For example, in Marcus, Stowel & Beye Govt. Sec.f Inc. v. Jefferson Invest Corp., 
797 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1986), although the plaintiff was awarded its lost profits on both 
its breach of contract and tortious interference claims against the defendant, the plaintiff 
appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to award 
damages based on defendant's profits rather than plaintiffs damages. Id. at 230. The 
Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that "the measure of damages for interference with 
contractual relations is identical to that for breach of contract" and therefore "the district 
court properly limited [plaintiffs] actual damage award to [plaintiffs] loss as a result of 
the interference." Id. at 232. 
These authorities support previous pronouncements of this Court and other courts 
interpreting Utah law, and should be followed here as persuasive authority supporting the 
resolution of the second certified question in the negative—that Utah law does not permit 
See also American Air Filter Co., 527 F.2d at 1300-01 (rejecting restitution 
theory because measure of damages in Pennsylvania and Kentucky for tortious 
interference is plaintiffs lost profits as in breach of contract cases); Developers Three v. 
Nationwide Insurance Co., 582 N.E.2d 1130, 1136 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting 
"unjust enrichment" as measure of damages and holding that "correct measure of 
damages in this tortious interference action is plaintiffs loss (including lost profits) that 
arises out of the tortious interference"). 
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unjust enrichment as a remedy for tortious interference, but instead requires a showing of 
lost profits or other damages actually caused by the tortious interference. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondents respectfully request that the Court resolve 
the certified questions in the Order of Acceptance as follows: 
First, Utah law does not permit an employer claiming damages to recover an 
award of "restitution or unjust enrichment damages" for breach of provisions of 
employment contracts, but instead limits the employer's recover against the former 
employee to lost profits and other damages resulting from the employee's breach. 
Second, Utah law does not recognize an "unjust enrichment measure of damages" 
for tortious interference; rather, a plaintiff is entitled to recover actual damages, including 
lost profits, actually and proximately caused by the defendant's tortious conduct. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of November, 2007. 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
By: f^laJjX . // 
Richard M. Hymas 
J. Mark Gibb 
Erik A. Olson 
Jason R. Hull 
Attorneys for Respondents 
\y^o\^ 
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33 
o r /~* i r\ir 
Tab A 
Case 1:06-cv-00024-PGC Document 293 Filed 08/16/2007 Page 1 of 3 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
IN THE £H!8UfcWE.#pURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH AUG 1 ^ 2007 
— x 
TruGreen Companies, a Delaware— 
limited liabilit^^p^^^j[?R^ 
Trugreen Limited Partnership, 
a Delaware limited partnership, 
Plaintiffs and Petitioners, 
v. Case No. 20070451-SC 
No. 1:06CV00024 PGC 
Mower Brothers, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
ORDER OF ACCEPTANCE 
This matter is before the court upon the Certification of 
Question of State Law to this court by the United States District 
Court for the District fo Utah. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Utah Supreme Court accepts the 
following questions certified to it: 
1. Whether under Utah law a former employer is entitled to 
an award of lost profits damages, or instead an award 
of restitution or unjust enrichment damages, where a 
former employee has breached contractual non-
competition, non-disclosure, and employee non-
solicitation provisions? 
2. Whether Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment 
measure of damages for tortious interference with a 
competitor's and economic relations? 
The certifying court has not filed any portion of the record 
in the matter with the Supreme Court. Within fourteen days of 
the date of this order, counsel for the parties shall advise this 
court as to what portions of the record they believe necessary 
for consideration of.the certified questions. 
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Following the expiration of the fourteen days, this court 
will request those portions of the record from the United States 
District Court and provide notice to the parties as to a briefing 
schedule. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Date /i / C h r i s t i n e M. Durham, 
Chief J u s t i c e 
TabB 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION 
TRUGREEN COMPANIES, L.L.C., a 
Delaware limited liability company, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MOWER BROTHERS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER CERTIFYING 
QUESTIONS OF LAW TO THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Case No. 1:06CV00024 PGC 
The impetus for this certification is a dispute over the proper measure of damages for the 
breach of an employment agreement, tortious interference with contractual and economic 
relationships, and violation of Utah's Unfair Competition Act. Plaintiffs TruGreen Companies, 
L.L.C., and TruGreen Limited Partnership ("TruGreen") assert claims against four former 
TruGreen employees, Ryan Mantz, Lary Gaythwaite, James LeBlanc, and David Stephensen 
("employee defendants"), along with their current employer, Mower Brothers, Inc., and two 
directors of Mower Brothers, Jean Babilis and Kevin Bitton. First, TruGreen alleges that the 
employee defendants have breached three provisions of the TruGreen employment agreements: a 
non-competition provision, a non-disclosure provision, and an employee non-solicitation 
provision. Second, TruGreen asserts that Mower Brothers, Bitton, Babilis, and some of the 
employee defendants tortiously interfered with TruGreen's economic and contractual 
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relationships. Third, TruGreen alleges that Mower Brothers, Bitton, and Babilis violated Utah's 
Unfair Competition Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-5a-103. Defendants deny these claims in all 
respects. 
With regard to potential damages in this case, TruGreen asserts that an unjust enrichment 
or restitution measure of damages is appropriate for all of its claims. The measure of damages 
under an unjust enrichment theory is generally the amount of defendant's profits. Defendants 
argue that the appropriate measure of damages is lost profits, which is the amount of profit lost to 
the plaintiff because of the breach, interference, or unfair competition. The Court has determined 
that there appears to be no controlling Utah law addressing these damages issues. 
Consequently, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah certifies to the Utah Supreme Court these questions 
of law, which are controlling in the above-captioned matter now pending before this Court: 
1. Whether under Utah law a former employer is entitled to an award of lost profits 
damages, or instead an award of restitution or unjust enrichment damages, where a former 
employee has breached contractual non-competition, non-disclosure, and employee non-
solicitation provisions? 
2. Whether Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for tortious 
interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations? 
2 
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3. Whether "actual damages" under Utah Code Ann. § 13-5a-103(l)(b)(i), the Utah 
Unfair Competition Act, means the plaintiffs lost profits or an award of damages defined by the 
defendant' s revenues? 
To provide some context to the three certified questions, some brief discussion is in 
order. The parties disagree over the appropriate theory of damages to be applied in this case. 
TruGreen asserts that an unjust enrichment or restitution measure of damages is appropriate for 
all of its claims, while the Defendants argue that the appropriate measure of damages is lost 
profits. This Court will briefly address the parties' arguments as they relate to the various causes 
of action to clarify the scope of the three certified questions. 
1. Breach of Contract Claims 
TruGreen seeks restitutionary damages against the employee defendants for their alleged 
breach of the non-competition, non-disclosure, and employee non-solicitation provisions in the 
employee contracts. The Defendants contend that any possible damages are limited to 
TruGreen's own net lost profits proximately caused by specific breaches by each particular 
defendant. The Defendants point out that the majority of state courts that have addressed this 
issue appear to limit damages to the employer's lost profits or other consequential losses.1 The 
1
 See, e.g., Am. Air Filter Co. v. McNichol, 527 F.2d 1297, 1300 (3d Cir. 1975) (limiting 
damages to lost profits when addressing a breach of a non-competition agreement); The Toledo 
Group, Inc. v. Benton Indus., Inc., 623 N.E.2d 205, 211 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (applying a lost 
profits measure of damages to breach of non-disclosure agreement); Nationscredit Corp. v. CSSI, 
The Support Group, Inc., 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 1313 (Tex. App. Mar. 21, 2002) (noting that 
unjust enrichment is not a proper measure of damages for breach of a non-solicitation 
agreement). 
3 
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Defendants assert that these courts have chosen to limit damages in this way by applying general 
contract principles recognized in Utah - such as the principle that a non-breaching party is 
entitled to recover its "expectation interest," which involves placing the non-breaching party in as 
good a position as if the contract were performed.2 The Defendants also cite the Utah principle 
that "a party to a contract has a right of rescission and an action for restitution as an alternative to 
an action for damages where there has been a material breach of the contract by the other party."3 
Additionally, Defendants argue that the Utah Supreme Court uses the terms "restitution" and 
"unjust enrichment" interchangeably to describe the equitable remedy that involves restoring to a 
plaintiff the benefit it provided to a party that is not subject to an express contract.4 A court's 
application of such principles to the contract claims in this case, in the view of the Defendants, 
strongly supports a lost profits theory of recovery. 
TruGreen responds that it is not limited to recovering its lost profits but also any unjust 
enrichment by the Defendants. TruGreen first notes the difficulty of using a lost profits measure 
of damages in breach of non-competition, non-disclosure, and non-interference cases. In System 
Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, the Utah Supreme Court held that injunctive relief may be an 
appropriate remedy for the breach of a non-competition agreement given that "the damages that 
may result from the misappropriation of confidential information and goodwill 'could be 
2
 See, e.g., Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982). 
3
 Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979). 
4
 See Am. Towers Owners Ass n v. CCIMeck, 930 P.2d 1182, 1192-93 (Utah 1996). 
4 
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estimated only by conjecture and not by any accurate standard."'5 TruGreen then notes that the 
Utah Supreme Court has generally acknowledged that an injured employer may also maintain a 
claim for damages in addition to seeking injunctive relief.6 Furthermore, the Utah Supreme 
Court has shown a willingness to honor liquidated damage provisions in a non-competition 
agreement, provided the liquidated amount is reasonable, given that u[t]here is no doubt that the 
harm caused by the breach was one that was difficult to estimate with much accuracy."7 
In addition to the difficulty of using a lost profits measure of damages for breach of non-
competition cases, TruGreen also recounts the deterrent effect of applying an unjust enrichment 
theory of damages. In National Merchandising Corp. v. Leyden, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court held that an employee who breached a non-competition agreement and the competitor who 
induced the breach were liable to account for their gains associated with the breach.8 Leyden 
noted that "an intending tortfeasor should not be prompted to speculate that his profits might 
exceed the injured party's losses, thus encouraging commission of the tort."9 According to 
TruGreen, the deterrent effect resulting from restitutionary damages, coupled with the difficulty 
of using a lost profits measure in breach of non-competition, non-disclosure, and non-
5
 669 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1983) (quoting Columbia Coll of Music & Sch. of Dramatic 
Art v. Thunberg, 116 P. 280, 282 (Wash. 1911). 
6
 See Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Dixon, 831 P.2d 86 (Utah 1992). 
7
 Robbins, 45 P.2d at 626. 
8
 348 N.E.2d 771 (Mass. 1976). 
9
 M a t 775-76. 
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interferences cases, are more than sufficient grounds to support restitutionary damages for the 
contractual provisions at issue in this case. 
While both parties strongly argue their respective positions, they both concede that no 
Utah court has expressly determined the proper measure of damages for breach of these specific 
contract provisions. Consequently, this Court respectfully asks the Utah Supreme Court to 
answer the first certified question. 
2. Tortious Interference with Economic and Contractual Relations 
The second certified question is whether Utah recognizes an unjust enrichment measure 
of damages for tortious interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations. 
Both parties acknowledge that the Utah Court of Appeals has generally adopted Section 774A of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the measure of damages for tortious interference with 
contract. Section 774A provides that 
(1) One who is liable to another for interference with a contract or prospective 
contractual relation is liable for damages for 
(a) the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or the prospective 
relation; 
(b) consequential losses for which the interference is a legal cause; and 
(c) emotional distress or actual harm to reputation, if they are reasonably to 
be expected to result from the interference.10 
Despite their respective reliance on Section 774A, the parties disagree regarding the effect of the 
Utah Court of Appeal's adoption of this section. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A (1979). 
6 
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The Defendants argue that Sampson v. Richins is fully instructive on this issue.11 In 
Sampson, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed cross-appeals on the amount of damages awarded 
to defendants for Sampson's intentional interference with defendants' economic relations.12 
Sampson upheld the trial court's damages award pursuant to Section 774A, noting that "one who 
is ultimately deemed liable to another for interference with economic relations is liable for 'the 
pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or the prospective relation; [or] consequential losses 
for which the interference is a legal cause . . . ."13 Applying Section 774A, Sampson held that the 
trial court's findings regarding damages "must identify actual pecuniary losses suffered by 
[plaintiff] as a result of [defendant's conduct."14 In addition to their reliance on Sampson, 
Defendants point to numerous courts outside of Utah that recognize that plaintiffs lost profits, 
and not restitution of defendant's revenues, are the proper measure of damages for tortious 
interference.15 
Although TruGreen concedes that the Utah Court of Appeals has generally adopted 
Section 774 A, it maintains that such an adoption nevertheless allows for the application of unjust 
11
 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
12
 M a t 999-1002. 
13
 Id. at 1006-07 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A (1979)). 
14
 Id. 
15
 See, e.g., Marcus, Stowell & Beye Gov't Sees., Inc. v. Jefferson Inv. Corp., 797 F.2d 
227, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding under Texas law that damages for tortious interference are 
measured by plaintiffs lost profits). 
7 
Case 1:06~cv-00024-PGC Document 287 Filed 06/08/2007 Page 8 of 10 
enrichment damages in some tortious interference cases. First, TruGreen cites comment c of 
Section 774A, where the commentators note that "[a] major problem with damages of this sort is 
whether they can be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty."16 Second, TruGreen argues 
that the fact Utah courts have adopted Section 774A merely supports the idea that the measure of 
damages in tortious interference cases must mirror the measure of damages for the underlying 
breach. In Storage Technology Corp. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the Eighth Circuit cited Section 
774A but subsequently found that under Minnesota law, "[a]n employee who breaches a 
noncompetition or nondisclosure covenant can be required to account for his profits."17 The 
court reasoned that "where the interference alleged is inducement of breach of restrictive 
covenants or fiduciary duties, the remedy should mirror the restitutionary remedy available for 
the breach of the covenant or fiduciary duty."18 Also, as was discussed above, TruGreen 
contends that a lost profit measure of damages would encourage competitors and employees to 
speculate that their gains will outweigh losses and thereby encourage the breach of valid and 
enforceable covenants.19 
As far as the Court and the parties can assess, no Utah court has directly addressed the 
measure of damages where former employees and a competitor tortiously interfere in the context 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A cmt. c (1979). 
395 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 2005). 
Id. 
See Nat'I Merck Corp. v. Leyden, 348 N.E.2d 771 (Mass. 1976). 
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of an employment contract containing non-competition, non-disclosure, and non-interference 
provisions. To determine whether Utah recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for 
tortious interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations, this Court 
respectfully requests the Utah Supreme Court to answer the second certified question. 
3. Unfair Competition 
TruGreen has asserted a claim under Utah's Unfair Competition Act, which limits 
recovery to "actual damages."20 The parties differ over whether this phrases extends to lost 
profits or an award of damages defined by the defendant's revenues. It appears that no Utah 
court has interpreted the meaning of "actual damages" under this statute. Consequently, this 
Court respectfully aks that the Utah Supreme Court answer the third certified question. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court has concluded that there is no controlling case law addressing the three 
questions of law discussed above. Because these questions of law are controlling in this case, 
this Court certifies these questions to your Court. The clerk of this Court shall transmit a copy of 
this Order of Certification to counsel for all parties to the proceedings in this Court. The clerk 
shall also submit to the Utah Supreme Court a certified copy of this Order and any other portion 
of the record before this Court that may be required by the Utah Supreme Court. Under Rule 
41 (f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court orders that each party shall bear its 
own fees and costs of this certification. 
20
 Utah Code Ann. § 13-5a-103(l)(b)(i). 
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SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 8th day of June, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Paul G. C^ssell 
United States District Judge 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION 
TRUGREEN COMPANIES, L.L.C., a 
Delaware limited liability company, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SCOTTS LAWN SERVICE, et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
STRIKE EXPERT REPORT, AND 
DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 1:06CV00024 
Both parties in this case have moved for summary judgment on whether defendants are 
liable to plaintiffs for breach of contract, intentional interference with contractual relations, 
intentional interference with economic relations, and unfair competition. On the record that has 
been developed, this case is not amenable to complete resolution on summary judgment. 
Numerous material facts dealing with the primary players in this action remain disputed, and, 
barring settlement, will have to be resolved at trial. Nevertheless, the court finds that a few 
claims are ripe for resolution. 
First, the court finds that defendants Jason Beck, Paul Brower, Richard Coffman, Alfreda 
Egbert, Margie Smith, Jessica Spencer, Shannon Christensen, James Murray, and Matt Walker 
(the "New Utah Employees") are entitled to summary judgment on TruGreen's claims against 
them for both breach of contract and intentional interference with existing and prospective 
economic relations. This conclusion is warranted if not for the sole reason that TruGreen elected 
not to address these defendants' claims in its opposition and other memoranda. However, even if 
TruGreen had addressed these issues, the plain language of the employee contracts and the lack 
of evidence showing contact between these employees and former or current TruGreen 
employees and customers supports summary judgment in the defendants' favor. Being that these 
are the only two claims asserted against the New Utah Employees, the court eliminates these 
defendants from the case. 
Second, the court finds that all of the remaining employee defendants - Ryan Mantz, Lary 
Gaythwaite, Jim LeBlanc, David Stephensen, Jason Hiller, James Clogston, Rick Deerfield, 
David Van Acker, and Tammy Roehr - are entitled to summary judgment on TruGreen's claims 
of intentional interference with existing and prospective economic relations. There is little direct 
evidence of actual post-employment contact between these Scotts employees and current or 
former customers of TruGreen, and even when contact or possible diversion was shown, no 
reasonable juror could conclude from the evidence supplied that any contact or diversion by these 
defendants was done with an improper purpose or by improper means, as required by both Utah 
and Idaho law. 
Third, with respect to TruGreen's contract claims, the court finds the following: (1) 
Mantz and Stephensen are entitled to summary judgment on Trugreen's claim for breach of the 
non-competition provision because even if these defendants' most recent non-compete 
agreements are enforceable under Utah law, neither provision prohibits post-employment 
competition; (2) LeBlanc, Stephensen, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, and Roehr are entitled to 
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summary judgment on the claim for breach of the non-interference provision because there is no 
evidence that these defendants induced or encouraged TruGreen employees to leave TruGreen; 
and (3) Mantz, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, Stephensen, Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, and 
Roehr are entitled to summary judgment on TruGreen's claim for breach of the non-solicitation 
provision because there is no evidence that they solicited or contacted TruGreen customers with 
whom they had actual contact while employed by TruGreen. 
Also before the court is Scotts' motion to strike TruGreen's expert report and evidence of 
damages (#202). The court finds that Mr. Elggren's conclusions in this case are not sufficiently 
reliable to survive scrutiny under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Consequently, the 
court GRANTS Scotts' motion to strike TruGreen's expert report (#202) and will preclude 
testimony from Mr. Elggren at trial. 
Because the court denies TruGreen's summary judgment motion without having to strike 
any of the challenged facts or testimony, the court finds the following motions by Scotts to be 
MOOT, unless specifically addressed in the decision below: motion to strike affidavit and 
deposition testimony supporting TruGreen's motion for summary judgment (#217); motion to 
strike portions of affidavit of Adam Close and deposition testimony of Bradley Roach (#228); 
motion to strike evidence relied on by TruGreen in its summary judgment reply memorandum 
(#245). 
As explained above and outlined in more detail below, the court GRANTS in part and 
DENIES in part Scotts' motion for summary judgment (#175; #181; #183; #185; #187) and 
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GRANTS Scotts' motion to strike TruGreen's expert report and evidence of damages (#202). 
The court DENIES TruGreen's motions for summary judgment (#151 and #177). 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.1 Rather than recite the entire backdrop of this case, 
the court briefly recites the facts relevant to this order. For the purpose of resolving these 
competing motions for summary judgment, the court finds the following facts. 
General Background 
Trugreen is a lawn care company with offices throughout the United States. It is the 
nation's largest provider of residential lawn care and undertakes substantial marketing and sales 
efforts to establish and maintain its customer base. Employing many full-time individuals, 
TruGreen utilizes sales representatives who are responsible for selling TruGreen programs and 
services, compiling lists of prospective customers, engaging in person-to-person contacts by 
telephone and neighborhood marketing efforts, and following up with customer inquiry leads. 
The branch marketing managers at TruGreen plan, direct, and coordinate marketing and sales 
efforts and the branch managers have general oversight and control of a branch office. TruGreen 
asserts that each employee receives an extensive and consistent regiment of specialized and 
confidential training, but defendants maintain that the training of the named employees in this 
1
 Cortez v. McCauley, 438 F.3d 980, 988 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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action was minimal. Trugreen requires its employees to sign confidentiality and non-competition 
contracts as a condition of their employment. 
The current dispute arose when Ryan Mantz, a former branch manager of Trugreen's 
Ogden branch, voluntarily resigned from Trugreen on or about November 1, 2005. Within weeks 
of leaving, Mantz began working for Scotts in Ogden, Utah, one of Trugreen's direct 
competitors. Mantz allegedly began recruiting other Trugreen employees to join him at Scotts. 
From November 2005 to the present, a number of TruGreen employees have left to work for 
Scotts. The following groups of defendants are all former TruGreen employees that worked for 
Scotts after leaving TruGreen. 
The "New Utah Employees" 
Jason Beck, Paul Brower, Richard Coffman, Alfreda Egbert, Margie Smith, Jessica 
Spencer, Shannon Christensen, James Murray, and Matt Walker are all former employees of 
TruGreen that have recently worked for Scotts. Each of these employees began working for 
TruGreen at various times, one starting as early as 1996, and they all left TruGreen in either 2005 
or 2006. During their employment with TruGreen, employees Beck, Brower, Coffman, Egbert, 
Smith, and Spencer, respectively, all signed one and only one, non-compete agreement in favor 
of TruGreen. Each of the agreements signed by these employees contained a non-competition 
provision that reads: 
During Employee's employment with TruGreen, the Employee shall not, without the 
express written approval of TruGreen's President, Chief Operating Officer, or 
General Counsel, directly or indirectly, own, manage, participate in or otherwise 
engage or have any connection with any business which provides any service or 
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product that, to the Employee's knowledge, is provided or proposed to be provided 
by TruGreen. 
In addition to this non-competition provision, each of the agreements contained provisions 
covering the solicitation of TruGreen customers, interference with TruGreen employees, and the 
disclosure of confidential information. The non-solicitation provision reads: 
(b) Non-solicitation. During Employee's employment with TruGreen and for a 
period of one (1) year following the termination of such [employment],... Employee 
will not, . . . directly or indirectly, on behalf of himself or others, solicit in any 
manner (with the intent of directly or indirectly providing any service or product 
competitive with the service or product which is provided by TruGreen . . . ) any 
TruGreen customer with whom Employee had actual contact with while employed 
by TruGreen. 
The agreements also contain a non-interference provision: 
(c) Non-interference. Employee shall not directly or indirectly induce or encourage 
(i) any TruGreen employee or contractor to leave his/her position or to seek 
employment or association with any person or entity other than TruGreen . . . . 
Each of the agreements also contain provisions regarding confidential information: 
The parties agree that Employee is or is about to be employed by TruGreen in a 
capacity which may permit Employee to have access to confidential information not 
generally known to the public, including Trade Secrets, in which TruGreen has 
invested substantial time, money and effort in developing and thus has a valuable 
property interest in, including but not limited to, marketing and sales techniques, 
product and equipment information, financial data, billing rates, formulas, methods, 
theories, manuals, customer expectations and customer data (collectively 
"Confidential Information"). A 'Trade Secret" is any information (whether or not 
written or stored in any medium) that derives independent economic value from not 
being generally known to, or being readily ascertainable through proper means, by 
the public . . . . 
4. Confidentiality/Non-Disclosure 
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(a) Non-Disclosure of Confidential Information. Employee acknowledges 
that during the course of performing Employee's duties hereunder, Employee will 
have access, and has heretofore had access, to TruGreen's Confidential Information. 
Employee, while in TruGreen's employ or at any time thereafter, will no t . . . directly 
or indirectly communicate or divulge, or use for Employee's own benefit or for the 
benefit of any other person or entity, any Confidential Information which Employee 
acquired during the course of Employee's employment with TruGreen . . . . 
(b) Return of Information. Promptly after the termination of Employee's 
employment with TruGreen or upon TruGreen's request at any time (whichever 
occurs earlier), Employee will deliver to TruGreen all business related documents 
including, but not limited to, originals and copies of memoranda, customer lists, 
materials relating to procedures, samples, records, documents, contracts, formulas, 
computer programs, product information and any other Confidential Information 
which Employee has obtained while employed by TruGreen. 
Shannon Christensen, James Murray, and Matt Walker are also former employees of 
TruGreen that subsequently worked for Scotts. Unlike the New Utah Employees discussed in the 
preceding paragraph, these employees all signed at least two non-competition agreements. 
Murray signed a confidentiality agreement with TruGreen on March 21, 2001, in which 
he agreed not to take certain materials with him when he left TruGreen or to encourage other 
employees to terminate their relationships with TruGreen. On January 13, 2003, Murray signed 
an employee confidentiality/non-compete agreement with Trugreen which stated that while he 
was employed with TruGreen he would not work for any other company that was in competition 
with TruGreen. The contract also contained non-solicitation and non-interference provisions, 
which applied for a year following Murray's employment. On March 22, 2004, Murray signed 
the same contract again. 
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Christensen signed an employee confidentiality/non-compete agreement on May 5, 2000, 
in which she agreed that for six months following her termination with TruGreen she would not 
work for a company within the same geographic region that was in direct competition with 
TruGreen. The May 5 contract also contemplated non-disclosure, non-solicitation, and 
confidentiality provisions. Christensen later signed another employment agreement, at the 
request of TruGreen. This contract also included non-disclosure, non-compete, and non-
solicitation provisions. Notably, however, this second contract stated that Christensen's non-
competition agreement was only valid while she was employed with TruGreen. 
On January 4, 1999, Walker signed an employee confidentiality/non-compete agreement 
in which he agreed that for six months following his termination with TruGreen he would not 
work for a company within the same geographic region that was in direct competition with 
TruGreen. The January 4 contract also contemplated non-disclosure, non-solicitation, and 
confidentiality provisions. On October 23, 2003, Walker signed another employment agreement, 
at the request of TruGreen. This contract also included non-disclosure, non-compete, and non-
solicitation provisions. Notably, however, this second contract stated that Walker's non-
competition agreement was only valid while he was employed with TruGreen. 
Murray, Walker, and Christensen, after starting their new employment at Scotts and 
between February 2005 and May 2006, each received a letter from TruGreen reminding them of 
the employment contract they had signed with TruGreen. Each of the three letters referenced 
only the most recent contract signed by the former employees and specifically mentioned the 
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confidential information and solicitation provisions of that contract. Copies of the most recent 
agreements signed by these employees were sent as attachments to the letter. 
The New Utah Employees did not take any documents or information belonging to 
TruGreen when they left and have not disclosed any TruGreen documents or materials belonging 
to TruGreen. None of the employees remember any specific customer, financial, sales, 
marketing, training, or other information that they may have seen or heard while employed by 
TruGreen, and they have not used or disclosed any such information while working for Scotts. 
Since going to work for Scotts, these employees have not contacted anyone they know to be a 
TruGreen customer for the purpose of soliciting business. Also, the New Utah Employees have 
not induced or encouraged any TruGreen employee to leave TruGreen or go to work for Scotts. 
Lastly, these employees have not encouraged any current or former TruGreen employee to violate 
the terms of any agreement that they have with TruGreen. 
The "Utah Employees" 
Ryan Mantz started working for TruGreen in 1993 and has worked for TruGreen in 
various positions and in various geographic areas for over twelve years. He spent his last years 
of employment with TruGreen working as the Ogden Branch Manager. In October 2005, Mantz 
left TruGreen and started working for Scotts as the branch manager of Scott's Salt Lake City 
franchise, and is also recognized to be the regional marketing manager. 
While employed at TruGreen, Mantz entered into at least two non-compete agreements. 
The first agreement, signed on April 19, 1993, includes a non-competition provision that reads: 
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During the six month period immediately following the termination of my 
employment with TruGreen, I will not, within any geographic area in which I was 
assigned duties during the last six months of my employment with TruGreen, directly 
or indirectly become interested in (as an individual, partner, stockholder, director, 
officer, principal, agent, employee, trustee, lender of money or in any other relation 
or capacity whatsoever) any business which renders services that compete with 
services provided by TruGreen. 
Mantz signed another non-compete agreement in favor of TruGreen in 2003. This New 
Agreement contained the same non-competition provision as the agreements signed by the New 
Utah Employees. Namely, it only prohibited Mantz from competing with TruGreen during his 
employment with TruGreen. Mantz's 2003 Agreement also included the same non-solicitation, 
non-interference, and non-disclosure provisions contained in the agreements signed by the New 
Utah Employees. 
In January 2006, Mantz received a letter from TruGreen's attorney, Carol Pearson, which 
requests that Mantz comply with the terms of the agreement that he signed with TruGreen. 
Pearson attached a copy of the 2003 Agreement to the January letter. Mantz continued to work 
for Scotts after receiving this letter. 
Mantz, in affidavit and deposition testimony, stated that since he began working for 
Scotts, he has not contacted any person known to him to be a TruGreen customer for the purpose 
of soliciting the person's business for Scotts. He also testified that he has not encouraged or 
caused any named employee to contact TruGreen's customers to solicit their business for Scotts. 
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Lary Gaythwaite was hired by TruGreen in 1998 as a sales representative in its Boise 
Branch. Between December 1999 and November 2005, Gaythwaite held a number of job titles 
with TruGreen, working in branch offices in both Utah and Idaho. In November 2005, 
Gaythwaite left TruGreen and accepted a position with Scotts as its Salt Lake City Branch 
Marketing Manager. 
Dave Stephensen and Jim LeBlanc were hired by TruGreen in 1994 and 2001, 
respectively. Both were hired as sales representatives, with Stephensen starting his work in 
TruGreen's Ogden office and LeBlanc working in the Boise branch. Stephensen worked for 
TruGreen between 1994 and 1997, and thereafter, from 2000 until January 2006. LeBlanc 
worked for TruGreen from 2001 until January 2005. Both Stephensen and LeBlanc left 
TruGreen in January 2006, and soon thereafter, started working for Scotts in its Ogden and Salt 
Lake City franchises, respectively. 
During their employment with Scotts, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, and Stephensen each signed 
at least two one non-competition agreement in favor of TruGreen. These agreements contain 
non-solicitation, non-interference, and non-disclosure provisions that are very similar to the ones 
contained in the agreements signed by Mantz and the New Utah Employees. However, the non-
competition provision in Gaythwaite's most recent agreement, signed in 2004, states that 
Gaythwaite may not compete with TruGreen for one year following his employment with 
TruGreen in any geographic area in which he was assigned duties during the last six months of 
his employment with TruGreen. Also, the non-competition provision contained in the agreement 
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signed by LeBlanc in 2002, states that LeBlanc may not compete with TruGreen for six months 
following his employment with TruGreen in any geographic area in which he was assigned duties 
during the last six months that he was employed by TruGreen. 
LeBlanc spent at least the last six months of his employment with TruGreen working at 
its Ogden branch in Clearfield, Utah. After leaving TruGreen, LeBlanc began working for Scotts 
in its Salt Lake branch. Gaythwaite also spent the last six months of his employment in 
TruGreen's Ogden office, and after leaving, worked for Scotts in its Salt Lake branch office in 
Murray, Utah. There is some testimony stating that Gaythwaite prepared budgets in Salt Lake 
City during his last six months of employment with TruGreen, and there is testimony that 
LeBlanc made collection calls out of Salt Lake City during the last six months of his employment 
at TruGreen. 
Stephensen signed an employee confidentiality/non-compete agreement on November 30, 
2000, in which he agreed that for the six month period following his termination with TruGreen, 
he would not work for a company within the same geographic region that was in direct 
competition with TruGreen. Stephensen later signed another employment agreement at the 
request of TruGreen on January 2, 2003. This contract also included non-disclosure, non-
compete, and non-solicitation provisions. Notably, however, this second contract stated that 
Stephensen's non-competition agreement was only valid while he was employed with TruGreen. 
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In January 2006, after they began working for Scotts, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, and 
Stephensen all received letters from TruGreen. Signed by TruGreen's attorney, the letters 
demand that Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, and Stephensen abide by the non-compete, non-disclosure, 
and non-solicitation provisions in their contracts. Enclosed with Pearson's letter to Gaythwaite 
was his 2004 Agreement; enclosed with Pearson's letter to LeBlanc was the 2002 Agreement; 
and attached to Stephensen's letter was a copy of his 2003 Agreement. 
The "Idaho Employees" 
In April 2002, TruGreen hired Jason Hiller to work as an aerator in Boise, Idaho. Three 
months later, Hiller became a TruGreen telemarketer in the Boise Office, and from August 2002 
to February 2004, Hiller worked as a salesman in the Boise office. From February 2004 to 
March 2005, Hiller spent time working for TruGreen or its affiliate as a marketing manager in 
Ogden, Utah, and Twin Falls, Idaho. For the last nine months that Hiller worked at Trugreen, 
March 2005 to November 2005, Hiller was a co-marketing manager in the Boise office. Hiller 
admits to receiving training from TruGreen, but denies that this training was specialized or 
unique. He also admits to watching two training DVDs. As the marketing manager, Hiller was 
exposed to customer lists and neighborhood lists used by TruGreen. During his employment at 
TruGreen, Hiller signed at least two non-compete agreements, the most recent one dated 
November 5, 2003. This agreement included a non-competition provision that reads: 
During the one (1) year period following termination of Employee's employment 
with TruGreen, Employee will not, within any geographic area in which Employee 
was assigned duties during the last six (6) months of employment, directly or 
indirectly becomes interested in (as an individual, partner, stockholder, director, 
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officer, principal, agent, employee, trustee, lender of money or in any other capacity) 
any work or activity that involves a product, process, service or development which 
is then competitive with a product, process, service, or development which is 
regularly used or planned to be used in the operation of TruGreen's business. 
Like the agreements signed by the Utah Employees, the agreements signed by the Idaho 
Employees also contained the non-disclosure, non-solicitation, and non-interference provisions. 
Hiller left TruGreen in November 2005 because, among other things, he believed the 
sales representatives he supervised were overworked and underpaid. When Hiller resigned, he 
had a brief conversation with Mitch Smith, in which Smith told Hiller: "You know, I don't care 
if you compete. I just ask you that you not harm my business directly." Soon after leaving 
TruGreen, Hiller started working for Scotts in Boise, Idaho. 
TruGreen hired Clogston, Deerfield, and Van Acker, in 2003, 2004, and 2005, 
respectively, as sales representatives at its Boise office. During the fall and winter, these 
salesmen made telephone sales calls using computer-generated information about prospective 
customers. During the spring and summer, they would be handed printed leads generated by 
TruGreen and they would visit each prospective customer, perform a lawn analysis, and leave the 
filled-out lawn analysis form for the customer. These employees had daily sales meetings where 
they discussed various statistical information. 
Tammy Roehr was hired by TruGreen in July 2001, to work as an auditor in TruGreen's 
Boise office. In this position, Roehr called people who had placed orders with TruGreen, 
verified that they had ordered the services shown on the sales sheet, and entered sales 
information into the computer. She claims that she received little training when she began her 
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work as an auditor. When she started her work as an auditor, she was given a script to use in 
making calls, and was trained on how to enter sales in to the computer system. 
Roehr worked as a commercial administrator in the Boise office from June 2003 to 
November 2005. Working in this capacity, Roehr scheduled appointments with TruGreen's 
commercial customers, sent out invoices, and set up and maintained a filing system for customer 
contracts. 
Each of these employees signed essentially identical non-competition agreements, all of 
which contained the same non-competition provision quoted above from Hiller's agreement, and 
the same non-solicitation, non-interference, and non-disclosure provisions included in the Utah 
Employees' agreements. Within six months of leaving TruGreen, each of these employees began 
working for Scotts in the same geographic area where they worked for TruGreen, namely, Boise, 
Idaho. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law."2 Courts may appropriately grant summary judgment "if there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."3 When a 
2
 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(c). 
3
 Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 564 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317,322(1986)). 
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case involves cross-motions for summary judgment, the court 4"construe[s] all inferences in 
favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration is made.'"4 
DISCUSSION 
The court must determine whether the former employees breached their contracts with 
TruGreen and whether these former employees and their new employers tortiously interfered 
with TruGreen's contractual and/or economic relations. In addressing a motion for a preliminary 
injunction in this case, the court suggested that the case might possibly be one that could be 
disposed of on summary judgment in favor of TruGreen. Having reserved judgment until the 
issues were fully briefed, the court concludes that this initial assessment has not turned out to be 
true. Material issues of fact remain as to the primary players and many of the claims, so 
TruGreen's case must go to trial. Nevertheless, the court is prepared to now grant summary 
judgment for Scotts on three specific claims. 
First, the court finds that the New Utah Employees are entitled to summary judgment on 
TruGreen's claims against them for both breach of contract and intentional interference with 
existing and prospective economic relations. Second, the court finds that all of the remaining 
employee defendants are entitled to summary judgment on TruGreen's claims of intentional 
interference with existing and prospective economic relations. Third, with respect to TruGreen's 
contract claims, the court finds that (1) Mantz and Stephensen are entitled to summary judgment 
4
 Am. Inv. Fin. v. United States, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1323 (D. Utah 2005) (quoting 
Pirkheim v. First UNUMLife Ins., 229 F.3d 1008, 1010 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
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on Trugreen's claim for breach of the non-competition provision, (2) LeBlanc, Stephensen, 
Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, and Roehr are entitled to summary judgment on the claim for 
breach of the non-interference provision, and (3) Mantz, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, Stephensen, 
Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, and Roehr are entitled to summary judgment on 
TruGreen's claim for breach of the non-solicitation provision. 
Also before the court is Scotts' motion to strike TruGreen's expert report and evidence on 
damages. Although the court finds that Mr. Elggren is qualified to offer an expert opinion in this 
case, the court finds that Mr. Elggren's conclusions in this case are not sufficiently reliable to 
survive scrutiny under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
The court will first address the three issues on which Scotts' is entitled to summary 
judgment and will then briefly address the claims for which summary judgment is not 
appropriate. Following this discussion, the court will address the issue of damages. 
I. CLAIMS AGAINST THE NEW UTAH EMPLOYEES 
The New Utah Employees, consisting of Spencer, Smith, Egbert, Brower, Coffman, Beck, 
Murray, and Christensen, are entitled to summary judgment on both of TruGreen's claims against 
them because: (1) their respective agreements do not prohibit them from competing against 
TruGreen after ending their employment, (2) TruGreen has failed to produce evidence that these 
employees breached any of the other clauses in their agreements, and (3) TruGreen has failed not 
only to demonstrate that the New Utah Employees had any contact with current or former 
TruGreen customers after starting their work with Scotts, but also that they diverted work from 
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TruGreen to Scotts with an improper purpose or by improper means. The court will first address 
the New Utah Employees's motion for summary judgment on the contract claims and then 
proceed to discuss the tortious interference with economic relations claims. 
A. Breach of Contract Claims Against New Utah Employees 
Because some of the New Utah Employees had signed multiple agreements, the court will 
address these employees separately from those that signed only one agreement. 
1. Claims against Spencer, Smith, Egbert, Brower, Coffman, and Beck 
Spencer, Smith, Egbert, Brower, Coffman, and Beck, respectively, all signed one 
agreement while employed with TruGreen. Like most of the other agreements at issue in this 
case, the agreements signed by these defendants contained provisions regarding confidentiality, 
solicitation, interference, and competition. As noted above, each of these agreements contained a 
non-competition provision that restricted the employees from competing with TruGreen only 
during their employment with TruGreen. Specifically, the provision reads: 
During Employee's employment with TruGreen, the Employee shall not, without the 
express written approval of TruGreen's President, Chief Operating Officer, or 
General Counsel, directly or indirectly, own, manage, participate in or otherwise 
engage or have any connection with any business which provides any service or 
product that, to the Employee's knowledge, is provided or proposed to be provided 
by TruGreen. 
Because this provision only prohibits its signer from competing with TruGreen during the 
employment, TruGreen cannot successfully assert breach of contract based on their subsequent 
employment with Scotts. Although the agreements signed by these employees also contained the 
non-disclosure, non-solicitation, and non-interference provisions that extended beyond the time 
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of their employment, TruGreen has failed to produce evidence of a disputed material fact as to 
whether these defendants breached any of these other provisions. Moreover, Smith, Spencer, 
Egbert, Brower, Coffman, and Beck produced affidavits refuting any allegations that they 
breached the respective provisions of their agreements with TruGreen. Based on this undisputed 
evidence, the court concludes that no reasonable juror could find that these defendants breached 
their agreements. 
2. Contract Claims against Christensen, Murray, and Walker 
During their employment at TruGreen, Murray signed three competition and non-compete 
agreements, Christensen signed two competition and non-compete agreements, and Walker 
signed at least two agreements. The court finds that the most recent agreements signed by these 
defendants supercede their prior agreements because the new agreements appear to fully cover 
the subject areas addressed in the old agreements. 
Under Utah law, a subsequent contract replaces the terms of a prior contract when (1) 
there is an existing valid contract; (2) all parties agreed to a new contract; (3) the new contract 
extinguishes the prior contract; and, (4) the new contract is valid.5 In order for a contract to be 
merged into another, it must be "plainly shown that such was the intent of the parties; and this is 
usually where the later contract fully covers an earlier one . . . ."6 Citing Idaho law, defendants 
provide additional insights as to when a subsequent agreement completely supplants a prior one, 
5
 Ford v. Am. Exp. Fin. Advisors, Inc., 98 P.3d 15, 22 (Utah 2004); Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 279 (1981). 
6
 Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346, 1351 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted). 
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noting that the new contract must either explicitly rescind the earlier contract, deal with the 
subject matter of the former contract so comprehensively as to be complete within itself and to 
raise the legal inference of substitution, or present such inconsistencies with the first contract that 
the two cannot in any substantial respect stand together.7 
The most recent agreements signed by Christensen, Murray, and Walker, not only appear 
to fully cover their respective earlier agreements, but the new agreements appear to be at odds 
with the earlier agreements, specifically with regard to the six-month covenant not to compete, 
which is contained in the earlier agreements. TruGreen contends that the new agreements do not 
fully cover the previous agreements because the "modified non-compete Agreements contain no 
provision or references whatsoever to a post-termination covenant that would supercede or 
extinguish the prior six-month covenants."8 The court is unpersuaded by this argument. Both 
the old and new agreements contained non-competition provisions, the primary difference being 
that the new agreements only prohibited competition during the time the defendants were 
employed at TruGreen. Put another way, the new agreement covered the exact same subject 
matter (non-competition) with a variation on the time involved. 
If there were any doubt on this issue, the letters from TruGreen's legal counsel resolve 
them. The letters remind their recipients that they signed a non-competition agreement while 
working at TruGreen, and attached to the letter, were copies of the new agreements, and only the 
7
 Silver Syndicate, Inc. v. Sunshine Min. Co., 611 P.2d 1011, 1020 (Idaho 1979). 
8
 Def.'s Mem. Opp. Summ. J. 26. 
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new agreements, signed by these defendants. While these letters arguably estop TruGreen from 
contending that two separate agreements exist, the simpler route to the same destination is to 
simply treat these letters as undisputed evidence that TruGreen itself viewed the early agreements 
as having been superceded. Consequently, the court finds that the new agreements are the 
controlling documents and they do not prohibit competition after leaving TruGreen. 
Therefore, the court grants summary judgment to Christensen, Murray, and Walker on 
TruGreen's breach of contract claim. 
B. Tortious Interference Claims Against All New Utah Employees 
The New Utah Employees are also entitled to summary judgment on TruGreen's claim of 
intentional interference with economic relations because TruGreen has failed to produce 
evidence that the New Utah Employees have contacted anyone known to them to be a current or 
former TruGreen customer, let alone shown that the New Utah Employees diverted work from 
TruGreen because of a desire to harm their former employer. 
Under Utah law, the tort of intentional interference with economic relations requires 
proof of three elements: (1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing 
or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing 
injury to the plaintiff."9 The Utah Supreme Court has recently explained that a plaintiff satisfies 
the second requirement by establishing either improper purpose or improper means.10 A plaintiff 
9
 Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 302 (Utah 1982); see also 
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, 331 (Utah 2005). 
10
 Anderson, 116 P.3d at 331. 
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seeking to show improper purpose must show that defendant's predominant purpose of 
interfering was to injure the plaintiff, and in this case, it would mean that the desire to harm 
TruGreen predominated over legitimate economic motivations. A plaintiff must show that the 
defendant was maliciously motivated, "in the sense of spite and a desire to do harm to the 
plaintiff for its own sake."11 To show improper means, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
"means used to interfere with a party's economic relations are contrary to law, such as violations 
of statutes, regulations, or recognized common-law-rules" including intimidation, deceit, 
misrepresentation, defamation, or disparaging falsehood.12 
It is not necessary to devote much discussion to the question of the New Utah Employees' 
potential liability for tortious interference because no evidence suggests that their diversion of 
work, if any, was motivated by a desire to injure TruGreen for the sake of injury. Nor has 
TruGreen demonstrated that the interference by theses particular employees, if any, occurred 
through improper means. TruGreen's failure to even address the New Utah Employees's motion 
for summary judgment is yet another ground to grant summary judgment for defendants on this 
claim, as well as the contract claims. For the most part, the parties' assiduous briefing has been 
exceptionally thorough, and the court recognizes the difficulty in adequately addressing in a 
single memorandum, numerous claims against numerous defendants. Nevertheless, it is not the 
11
 Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
12
 Id.; see also St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 201 (Utah 
1991). 
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job of the court to construct a party's arguments for him.13 TruGreen has failed to supply the 
court with evidence of these defendants' breach of contract or tort, not only in its opposition to 
defendants' motion for summary judgment, but even in its own motion for summary judgment. 
Accordingly, the court grants summary judgment for the New Utah Employees, and 
dismisses them from the case.14 
II. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIMS AGAINST REMAINING EMPLOYEE 
DEFENDANTS 
In its third cause of action, TruGreen alleges that all defendants intentionally interfered 
with its existing and prospective economic relations.15 The court finds that the remaining 
defendant employees in this case (Mantz, Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, Roehr, 
Gaythwaite, Stephenson, and LeBlanc) are entitled to summary judgment against TruGreen on 
these claims, primarily for the same reasons why the New Utah Employees are entitled to 
summary judgment: there is little evidence of actual contact with TruGreen customers, and even 
where contact or diversion is possibly shown, no reasonable juror could conclude from the 
evidence supplied that any contact or diversion was done with an improper purpose or by 
improper means, as required by both Utah and Idaho law. 
uSee Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 (10th Cir. 1999). 
14
 At oral argument on this matter, TruGreen conceded that it would not contest the grant 
of summary judgment on these "little fish" in this case. The court directs briefing on the issue of 
whether the dismissed defendants are entitled to attorneys' fees below. 
15
 Amend. C o m p l y 133-38. 
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At the heart of TruGreen's claims of tortious interference with economic relationships is 
the allegation that the defendants diverted work away from TruGreen and toward Scotts.16 
Although it is disputed whether Scotts targeted TruGreen's customers or attempted to solicit 
business from persons known to be TruGreen's customers, the evidence produced by TruGreen 
to show this contact is minimal. As is more fully discussed below, most of the "evidence" of 
contact is no more than a few isolated contacts, sprinkled with admissions that the Scotts 
employees may have spoken with TruGreen customers during their work at Scotts. 
Because Utah and Idaho have different standards for tortious interference of economic 
relations, the court will apply each of these laws where appropriate, but the end result on these 
claims is the same. 
A. Utah Tortious Interference Claims - Mantz, Gaythwaite, Stephensen, LeBlanc 
The parties agree that the tortious interference claims against Mantz, Gaythwaite, 
Stephensen, and LeBlanc are governed by Utah law. As explained above, there are three 
elements to the tort of intentional interference with economic relations under Utah law, namely: 
(1) that the defendant intentionally interferefs] with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic 
relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff."17 
At the heart of this issue is whether Scotts acted for an improper purpose or by improper 
means. Under Utah law, a plaintiff seeking to show improper purpose must show that 
16
 Id. 
17
 Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 302 (Utah 1982); see also 
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, 331 (Utah 2005). 
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defendant's predominant purpose for interfering was to injure the plaintiff; in this case, TruGreen 
must prove that these employees' desire to harm TruGreen predominated over their motive to 
profit. In other words, TruGreen must show that these defendants were maliciously motivated, 
"in the sense of spite and a desire to do harm to [TruGreen] for its own sake."18 Alternatively, 
TruGreen could prevail by showing these defendants used improper means. To show improper 
means, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the "means used to interfere with a party's economic 
relations are contrary to law, such as violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized common-
law-rules" including intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation, defamation, or disparaging 
falsehood.19 
Although Mantz, Gaythwaite, Stephensen, and LeBlanc appear to have had more 
experience and been more senior in status than their New Utah Employee colleagues at 
TruGreen, the facts show that these defendants had little to no contact with current or former 
TruGreen customers once they started working for Scotts. Moreover, TruGreen has failed to 
raise a disputed material fact with regard to whether these defendants acted with an improper 
purpose or by improper means. In fact, a close examination of the deposition testimony used to 
support TruGreen's position that these employees tortiously interfered with its economic 
relations reveals nothing of substance. Stephensen's deposition indicates: 
Q: Since terminating employment with TruGreen and working with Scotts, 
have you ever contacted any customer of TruGreen in the Ogden area? 
"Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
19
 Id. at 1003; see also St. Benedict's, 811 P.2d at 201. 
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A: Not to the best of my knowledge 
Q: Anybody else that you know? 
A: My dad and mom 
Q: Anybody else that you know? 
A: No. Well, not to my recollection. 
Q: Is it possible you could have spoken with former or current TruGreen 
customers while you were working with Scotts? 
A: When I was at Scotts? 
Q: Yeah, while you're at Scotts. 
A: Not that I know of. 
Q: You have no way of knowing either way? 
A: No.20 
LeBlanc's deposition indicates: 
Q: Do you know if some of the clients that you've contacted on the 
commercial side were former TruGreen clients? 
A: I've never contacted anybody. 
Q: Do you know if some of the clients that you have sold or provided services 
to on the commercial side were former TruGreen customers? 
A: I have no idea if that's true or not. 
Stephensen Dep. 89:5-90:5. 
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Q: So it may be true. You just don't know? 
A: Correct.21 
At most, the depositions show that it was possible that Stephenson and LeBlanc had 
spoken with current or former TruGreen customers.22 Mantz, since he began work at Scotts, has 
only spoken with two customers, and they were not, to his knowledge, TruGreen customers. 
Gaythwaite testified in his deposition that he "has not had any communication with, you know, 
current or past TruGreen customers after-the-fact, no, not at all."23 TruGreen as the plaintiff, 
however, has the burden of proving actual interference. Moreover, it is an unreasonable leap to 
suggest that this deposition testimony, even combined with the other facts and inferences 
suggested by TruGreen, demonstrates that the employees were acting for the predominant 
purpose of injuring TruGreen, or that their contacts with these customers were done through 
improper means as defined under Utah law. Accordingly, the court finds that these defendants 
should be granted summary judgment on TruGreen's claims of intentional interference with 
economic relations. 
21
 LeBlanc Dep. 87:23-88:7. 
22
 The court is aware of Byron Smith's deposition testimony in which he said that his 
retention manager said that former TruGreen customers said that LeBlanc said that "he worked at 
TruGreen and that he is now at Scotts and would like them to come over." B. Smith Dep. 135:19-
24. The court grants TruGreen's motion to strike this statement because the statement is triple 
hearsay and TruGreen did not address the statement in its opposition. Even if the court 
considered the statement, it fails to raise an issue of material fact with respect to LeBlanc's 
improper purpose or improper means. 
23
 Gaythwaite Dep. 189:22-24. 
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B. Idaho Tortious Interference Claims - Hiller, Clogston, 
Deerfield, Van Acker, Roehr 
The parties agree that the tortious interference claims against Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, 
Van Acker, and Roehr are governed by Idaho law. Under Idaho law, a plaintiff alleging tortious 
interference with economic relations must demonstrate that (1) there exists a valid economic 
expectancy or contract, (2) of which the defendant has knowledge, (3) that the defendants 
intentionally interfere with, thereby inducing termination or breach, (4) for an improper purpose 
or by improper means, (5) thereby resulting in damage to the plaintiff.24 Clarifying element 
number four, Idaho courts require a plaintiff alleging tortious interference with economic 
relations to show that "any claimed intentional interference with prospective economic advantage 
resulting in injury to the plaintiff is wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference 
itself."25 Despite this somewhat "lower standard" than Utah law, the facts of this case still 
warrant granting summary judgment in favor of the Idaho Employees on these claims. 
Much like the deposition testimony used to support its claim against the Utah Employees, 
TruGreen's deposition testimony offered in support of its claims against the Idaho employees 
fails to raise a material issue of fact that would preclude summary judgment on these issues. The 
Clogston deposition indicates: 
Q: Do you know whether any of the customers you currently provide service 
to at Scotts were former customers of TruGreen? 
24
 Highland Enter., Inc. v. Barker, 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (Idaho 1999). 
25
 Idaho First Nat'I Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 824 P.2d 841, 861 (Idaho 1991) (citation 
omitted). 
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A: Yes 
Q: In fact, some of them were, were they not? 
A: Yes26 
The Deerfield deposition indicates: 
Q: Have you ever fielded calls of any TruGreen customers, to the best of your 
knowledge? 
A: Yes, I have. 
Q: Did they explain to you that they were current TruGreen customers when 
they called you? 
A: Not - maybe during the course of the conversation that would come up, but 
I don't recall anybody calling saying, I am a TruGreen customer and I want to talk 
to you. 
Q: How would you come up that they were a TruGreen customer? 
A: I would ask them if they've had lawn care service in the past or if they 
traditionally take care of the lawn themselves just to get an idea as to how best to 
approach. You know, if they have had a lawn care company, then I generally 
wouldn't have to explain exactly how lawn care companies work, I would just talk 
to them about Scotts. 
Q: Do you ask them how long they had been a customer of TruGreen? Is that 
part of the sales call? 
A: I don't generally ask them that.27 
The Van Acker deposition indicates: 
ClogstonDep. 72:16-21. 
Deerfield Dep. 65:20-66:16. 
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Q: As a Scotts sales representative have you ever communicated with a 
TruGreen customer, either past or present, who you formally solicited yourself as a 
TruGreen employee? 
A: Yes. 
Q: How many times has that happened? 
A: Well, two neighbors and one customer who is very demanding, who I did 
not contact to sell her Scotts products, however, to let her know who to contact at 
TruGreen for any questions or concerns she had throughout the season. 
Q: This is what you told her while you were working for TruGreen? 
A: While I was working for Scotts. 
Q: Okay 
A: She was a very demanding customer. 
Q: And she subsequently called you back at Scotts? 
A: She is also a neighbor at - she is not only a customer but we have 
developed a good friendship over the years. We live on the same street - or my wife's 
family has a place in McCall, they live on the same street, you know, we see each 
other in passing, you know, hi, how are you doing. We became good friends. 
Q: Did she say why she switched to Scotts Lawn Service? 
A: She was not happy with the TruGreen service or was ready for a change. 
One of those; I don't recall. 
Q: Did she know that you worked for Scotts at that time when she called you 
back? 
A: She did. I - when I - yes. 
Q: At which point she switched from TruGreen to Scotts after talking to you? 
A: She wanted to see what we had to offer. 
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Q: What's this individual's name? 
A: Her name is Tammy Conrad.28 
Once again, the testimony of these defendants, coupled with their history and experience at 
Trugreen may raise an issue of material fact with regard to the first element (actual interference), 
but nothing provided by TruGreen raises a disputed fact as to whether the conduct was done with 
an improper purpose or by improper means. Accordingly, the court grants the Idaho Employees 
summary judgment on TruGreen's claim of intentional interference with economic relations. 
III. CONTRACT CLAIMS AGAINST EMPLOYEE DEFENDANTS 
Each of the agreements signed by the employee defendants contained similar provisions. 
The court finds that summary judgment is appropriate on the following claims: (1) Mantz and 
Stephensen are entitled to summary judgment on Trugreen's claim for breach of the non-
competition provision because, even if their most recent non-compete agreements are enforceable 
under Utah law, both provisions do not prohibit post-employment competition; (2) LeBlanc, 
Stephensen, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, and Roehr are entitled to summary judgment on the 
claim for breach of the non-interference provision because there is no evidence that these 
defendants induced or encouraged TruGreen employees to leave TruGreen; (3) Mantz, 
Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, Stephensen, Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, and Roehr are entitled 
to summary judgment on TruGreen's claim for breach of the non-solicitation provision because 
Van Acker Dep. 39:1-40:13. 
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there is no evidence that these employees solicited or contacted TruGreen customers with whom 
they had actual contact while employed by TruGreen. 
A. Breach of the Non-Competition Provision 
Mantz and Stephensen are entitled to summary judgment with respect to the non-
competition provision because their most recently signed agreements do not prohibit post-
employment competition. Under Utah law, as explained above, a subsequent contract replaces 
the terms of a prior contract when (1) there is an existing valid contract; (2) all parties agreed to a 
new contract; (3) the new contract extinguishes the prior contract; and, (4) the new contract is 
valid.29 In order for a contract to be merged into another, it must be "plainly shown that such was 
the intent of the parties; and this is usually where the later contract fully covers an earlier one . . . 
."
30
 A close examination of the "old" and "new" contracts signed by both Mantz and Stephensen 
reveals that although they both contained non-competition provisions, the new agreements only 
prohibited competition during the time the defendants were employed at TruGreen. Put another 
way, the new agreements covered the exact same subject matter (non-competition) with a 
variation on the time involved. Also, as the court noted above, TruGreen's letters to Mantz and 
Stephensen are undisputed evidence that TruGreen itself viewed the early agreements as having 
been superceded. Consequently, the court finds that the new agreements are the controlling 
documents and that they do not prohibit competition after leaving TruGreen. The court reaches 
29
 Ford v. Am. Exp. Fin. Advisors, Inc., 98 P.3d 15, 22 (Utah 2004); Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 279 (1981). 
30
 Horman v. Gordan, 740 P.2d 1346, 1351 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted). 
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this conclusion without deciding whether the non-competition provision is enforceable under 
Utah law. 
B. Breach of the Non-interference Provision 
LeBlanc, Stephensen, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, and Roehr are entitled to summary 
judgment on the claim for breach of the non-interference provision because there is no evidence 
that these defendants induced or encouraged any TruGreen employees to leave TruGreen or go to 
work for Scotts. Each of these named defendants have provided affidavit testimony that they did 
not induce or encourage any TruGreen employee to terminate his or her employment with 
TruGreen or go to work for Scotts, or breach any agreement they had with TruGreen. TruGreen 
failed to respond to these defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim, and has 
otherwise failed to produce evidence contradicting the affidavit testimony of these defendants. 
C. Breach of the Non-Solicitation Provision 
Mantz, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, Stephensen, Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, and 
Roehr are entitled to summary judgment on TruGreen's claim for breach of the non-solicitation 
provision because there is no evidence that these employees solicited or contacted TruGreen 
customers with whom they had actual contact while employed by TruGreen. Each of the named 
defendants have testified that, since going to work for Scotts, they have not contacted any person 
known to them to be a TruGreen customer for the purpose of soliciting the person's business for 
Scotts. As has been outlined above, TruGreen has presented deposition testimony that 
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demonstrates that some of these defendants may have done so, but TruGreen has failed to present 
any admissible evidence to refute the testimony of these defendants on this issue. 
IV. OTHER CLAIMS 
A, Contract Claims 
The court finds that disputed material facts remain with respect to the following claims 
and following defendants: (1) breach of the non-competition provision as to Gaythwaite, 
LeBlanc, Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, Roehr; (2) breach of non-disclosure provision 
as to Mantz, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, Stephensen, Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, and 
Roehr; and (3) breach of non-interference provision as to Mantz, Gaythwaite, and Hiller. The 
enforceability of the non-competition provisions under both Utah and Idaho law is a mixed 
question of fact and law and will need to be further developed at trial. 
B. Tort Claims 
The court finds that disputed material facts remain as to the following tort claims: (1) 
tortious interference with economic relations claim against Mower Brothers, Scotts, Greenside, 
Bitton, and Babilis; (2) tortious interference with contractual relations against Mower Brothers, 
Scotts, Bitton, Babilis, Mantz, Hiller, and Gaythwaite, and (3) unfair competition claim against 
Mower Brothers, Scotts, Greenside, Bitton, and Babilis. 
IV. DAMAGES 
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The court will first address defendants' motion to strike TruGreen's expert report and 
evidence of damages and will then turn to the issue of punitive damages. Also, the court directs 
additional briefing from the parties with respect to attorneys' fees. 
A. Motion to Strike Expert Report and Evidence of Damages 
Scotts urges this court to strike Mr. Elggren's report and exclude Mr. Elggren from giving 
an opinion at trial regarding TruGreen's alleged damages or lost profits. Scotts argues Mr. 
Elggren is not qualified to render the expert opinion expressed in his report and the evidence 
proffered is not reliable. Although the court finds that Mr. Elggren is qualified to offer an expert 
opinion in this case, the court also finds that Mr. Elggren's conclusions in this case are not 
sufficiently reliable to survive scrutiny under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
It is the duty of the trial judge to ensure that any scientific evidence or testimony is both 
relevant and reliable before it is admitted into evidence.31 This same gate-keeping function also 
applies to testimony and evidence based on "technical" and "other specialized" knowledge.32 
Based on Daubert, Rule 702 provides general standards for trial courts to use in assessing the 
reliability and helpfulness of expert testimony: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts 
3[Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). 
32Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). 
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or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) 
the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.33 
In other words, experts must identify the facts and data forming the basis for their testimony so 
courts can assess the sufficiency of the facts and data. And to be admissible, experts must base 
their opinions on scientific methods and procedures, not mere subjective belief or unsupported 
speculation. The court may exclude evidence where it finds "an impermissible analytical gap 
exists between the premises and conclusion."34 And it is the burden of the proponent of the 
evidence to establish that the requirements for its admissibility have been met, by a 
preponderance of the evidence.35 
Scotts challenges Mr. Elggren's expertise as well as the reliability of his report. 
Accordingly, the court must determine whether Mr. Elggren is qualified by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education to render an opinion in this case, and if the court finds Mr. 
Elggren qualified, it must determine whether his opinions are reliable under the appropriate 
standard.36 
First, Scotts claims that Mr. Elggren is not sufficiently qualified to offer expert opinions. 
The court disagrees. Mr. Elggren received his masters in business administration from the 
33
 Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
34
 Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 886 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation and 
internal quotations omitted). 
35
 SeeBourjailyv. Untied States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1983). 
36
 See Ralston v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 275 F.3d 965, 969 (10th Cir. 2001). 
36 
University of Utah in 1977, and has twenty-five years of experience in public accounting. Mr. 
Elggren is a certified public accountant, a certified fraud examiner, and a certified insolvency and 
reorganization advisor. He has testified concerning the value of assets, liabilities, or businesses, 
and has qualified to testify on damages, valuation, accounting, bankruptcy, and other financial 
matters in state and federal courts. 
Scotts concedes that Mr. Elggren has significant experience regarding forensic accounting 
and bankruptcy issues but argues that this experience and background is fundamentally different 
from experience regarding valuation, lost profits, and goodwill valuations. Scotts points to the 
fact that Mr. Elggren lacks the business valuation certifications that indicate expertise and ability 
in evaluating and analyzing markets. Although the court recognizes that Mr. Elggren may not 
have the ideal background for providing damages analysis in this case, his lack of certain training 
or certification does not necessarily mean that he does not have the required expertise. The court 
finds that TruGreen has established that Mr. Elggren is qualified to perform, supervise, and 
render opinions regarding damages analysis. 
Second, and more seriously, however, Scotts claims that Mr. Elggren's conclusions in this 
case are not sufficiently reliable to survive scrutiny under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Having reviewed the matter carefully, the court agrees with Scotts. 
The fundamental problem is that TruGreen has not explained how Mr. Elggren could 
reliably determine that profits earned by Scotts were in fact stolen away from TruGreen. So far 
as the court can determine from reviewing his report, Mr. Elggren essentially assumed that the 
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growth in Scotts profits were as a result of the new employees who left TruGreen. There are a 
number of problems with this approach. For starters, Mr. Elggren picks 30% as the percent of 
customers that Scotts was able to retain as a result of TruGreen employees. The basis for this 
figure is not revealed, other than to say it is an "estimate."37 A better term, so far as the court can 
tell, is a "guesstimate."38 While this guesstimate might be within the realm of reason, Rule 702 
requires more. In order to be admissible, Elggren's report must be reliable under the principles 
outlined in Daubert, including "(1) whether the proffered theory can and has been tested; (2) 
whether the theory has been subject to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; and 
(4) the general acceptance of a methodology in the relevant scientific community."39 The court 
has been given no reason from Mr. Elggren's report to accept the 30% figure, other than that 
appears to be about how much Scotts' profits increased in the year 2006 as opposed to 2005.40 
But this methodology does nothing more than assume the conclusion ~ that is, to assume that 
profits gained by Scotts came from the new employees. 
37
 F. Wayne Elggren, Calculation of Damages, December 4, 2006, ("Elggren Report") at 
7. 
38
 See Dictionary.com (to "guesstimate" is "to estimate without substantial basis in facts 
or statistics"). 
39103 Investors I, L.P. v. Square D Co., 470 F.3d 985, 990 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94). 
40
 See Elggren Report at 7 (noting that there was in increase in revenue of 38% in 2006 
compared to 4% in 2005). 
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As a separate and independent reason for rejecting this testimony, the court finds that the 
report does not seriously contend with potentially confounding causes of revenue gains and 
losses. For example, the defendants have offered as an undisputed fact (and TruGreen has not 
contested) that various factors would have to be taken into account in developing such a 
calculation. These undisputed relevant factors are: 
a. The specific items of confidential information that allegedly were taken by 
each Defendant who previously worked for TruGreen, including the impact 
that the use of each specific element of the confidential information could 
have on alleged damage elements including sales, profits, margins, expenses, 
and management efficiencies. 
b. Historical patterns of financial performance by TruGreen and how 
performance allegedly was impacted by the Defendants' alleged acts. 
c. Identification of which customers TruGreen allegedly lost to Mower Bros, as 
a result of the actions of the Defendants, or which customers allegedly were 
obtained by Mower Bros, as a result of allegedly using Trugreen's 
confidential information, utilizing the customer databases from both 
TruGreen and Mower Bros. 
d. Analysis that would show that but for the actions of the Defendants, 
TruGreen would have obtained the revenues obtained by Mower Bros. 
e. The dates that each defendant quit TruGreen and/or their subsequent hire date 
at Mower Bros, and the impact each Defendant allegedly caused to damages. 
f. The effect of TruGreen's Ogden location closing and its impact on both 
Defendants' decision to leave TruGreen and damages allegedly resulting 
therefrom. 
g. Alternative reasons for TruGreen's decreased sales and profitability in 2006, 
including levels of advertising, weather, regional economic factors, 
population growth, publicity, market acceptance of products and services, 
business life cycle issues, pricing differences, competitive forces, quality of 
products and customer services, and management decisions. 
39 
h. Alternative reasons for Mower Bros.' increased sales and profitability in 
2006, including levels of advertising, weather, regional economic factors, 
population growth, publicity, market acceptance of products and services, 
business life cycle issues, pricing differences, competitive forces, quality of 
products and customer services, and management decisions. 
i. Alternative reasons as to why Mower Bros, was able to retain customers in 
2006 that it obtained in 2005 other than by using confidential information 
from defendants, including levels of advertising, weather, regional economic 
factors, population growth, publicity, market acceptance of products and 
services, business life cycle issues, pricing differences, competitive forces, 
quality of products and customer services, and management decisions.41 
The defendants have also proffered, as undisputed facts, that "[a]ll of these issues directly 
relate to a proper assessment of damages and impact the calculation of damages. These issues 
are not adequately addressed, or were not considered by Mr. Elggren in preparing his report."42 In 
its response, TruGreen has not challenged these facts. Therefore, by rule,43 these facts are 
admitted for purposes of the motion. In light of those undisputed facts, the court is required to 
conclude that Mr. Elggren's report is not reliable. 
In addition, a change in the circumstances of this case renders the report speculative. 
TruGreen has recently stipulated to the dismissal of nine employees. While these were more 
lower-level employees, surely, if Mr. Elggren's theory is true, they had at least some role in the 
increased profits. His report indicates that it is based on the damage caused by all eighteen 
Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. to Strike If 24. 
Id. \ 25 (citations to Rasmussen affidavit omitted). 
DUCivR56-l(c). 
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employees originally sued in this case. Therefore, the court lacks admissible evidence of what 
damage is attributable to the nine employees remaining in this case. 
Finally, TruGreen argues briefly in its response brief that its goodwill has been damaged 
by the defendants' action, as proven by a franchise agreement between Scotts and the defendants. 
It may well be that plaintiffs goodwill has been damaged. The narrow question before the court, 
however, is whether Mr. Elggren's report is sufficiently reliable to be admitted as evidence in 
support of the amount of damages. Nothing in Mr. Elggren's report, at least as argued in the 
briefs before the court, gives the court sufficient confidence to admit it on the subject of damage 
to goodwill. Again, the defendants have addressed this point as an undisputed fact - without 
specific response from TruGreen. The defendants urge (correctly so far as the court can 
ascertain) that a goodwill calculation requires the expert to "account for any intervening factors 
or causes that may have otherwise impacted the difference in the value of the goodwill."44 Yet 
nothing in Mr. Elggren's report does that. 
Support for the court's conclusion comes from Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Systems, 
Inc.45 In Storage Technology, the court upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment for 
Cisco on Storage Technology's claims of interference with contractual relations, inducing breach 
of contract, corporate raiding, conversion, misappropriation of trade secrets, and breach of 
fiduciary duties, because Storage Technology failed to produce evidence supporting any amount 
Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. to Strike 143. 
395 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 2005). 
41 
of damages or restitution.46 The dispute arose out of NuSpeed Internet Systems' hiring of a 
number of Storage Technology's employees. Storage Technology's expert, George Norton, 
calculated a restitutionary remedy for the alleged damages stemming from this employee shift of 
$450 million - the exact amount for which Cisco purchased NuSpeed.47 Finding Norton's report 
to be too speculative to be admissible, the court noted: 
The first and most apparent problem with Norton's testimony is that he attributed the 
entire value of the NuSpeed acquisition to employees and trade secrets wrongfully 
appropriated from Storage Technology, even though NuSpeed had other assets and 
employees. Norton did not attempt to value the people or the technology supposedly 
belonging to Storage Technology by any means other than by ascertaining what price 
Cisco paid for NuSpeed.48 
Like the expert in Storage Technology, Mr. Elggren has not attempted to value the goodwill 
supposedly belonging to TruGreen by any other means other than by pointing to a franchise 
agreement between Mower Brothers and Scotts. 
In reaching its conclusion, the court is aware that the plaintiff has not had an opportunity 
to depose the defense expert, Mr. Rasmussen. However, none of the court's conclusions could 
be affected by cross-examination of Mr. Rasmussen. The undisputed facts recounted above, 
while relying on Mr. Rasmussen's affidavit for support, have not been challenged by TruGreen. 
Therefore, they are deemed admitted, regardless of what subsequent evidence TruGreen might 
M a t 929. 
Id. at 926. 
Id. 
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develop. Put another way, the problem here is TruGreen's failure to develop its affirmative case, 
rather than the need for Scotts to develop some case of its own. 
In light of these facts, the court will preclude damage testimony from Mr. Elggren at trial. 
The question then arises as to whether this entire case must be dismissed. The court's tentative 
impression is that it need not be dismissed, as the plaintiff might be able to prove nominal 
damages or perhaps some form of restitutionary damages in other ways. The court trusts, 
however, that the parties will brief this point in pre-trial submissions so that the court may have a 
fuller understanding of this issue before ruling. 
B. Punitive Damages 
The court finds that TruGreen is precluded from seeking punitive damages in this case. 
Punitive damages are reserved for cases where the defendant's conduct was "willful or 
malicious."49 The Utah Court of Appeals, in Promax Development Co. v. Mattson, upheld a 
district court's denial of punitive damages in an intentional interference with economic relations 
case, even though the district court expressly found that ProMax acted maliciously.50 The 
Promax court noted that "where a party prevails on an interference with prospective economic 
relations claim based on the improper purposes alternative of recovery, that party must show 
additional aggravating circumstances to recover punitive damages."51 Also, as correctly pointed 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1219 (Utah 1983). 
943 P.2d 247, 260 (1997). 
Id. 
43 
out by the defendants, "punitive damages are reserved for the most unusual and compelling 
circumstances."52 "There must be some element of outrage normally present in the commission 
of crimes or intentional torts."53 
TruGreen has failed to demonstrate additional aggravating circumstances, and the facts of 
this case are not so unusual or outrageous as to justify punitive damages. Consequently, the court 
eliminates punitive damages as a form of potential recovery for TruGreen. 
C. Future Briefing 
In light of the court's ruling on damages, the court expects additional briefing on the 
implications of the exclusion of Mr. Elggren. In particular, the court would appreciate briefing 
on whether the entire case must now be dismissed or whether plaintiff can prove damages in 
other ways. The court also expects briefing on whether the dismissed defendants are entitled to 
attorneys' fees. These, and all other issues regarding damages, will be discussed at the damages 
hearing scheduled for February 28, 2007, at 10:30 a.m. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Scotts' motion for summary 
judgment (#175; #181; #183; #185; #187) and GRANTS Scotts' motion to strike TruGreen's 
expert report and evidence of damages (#202). The court DENIES TruGreen's motions for 
Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Son Northwest, 606 P.2d 944, 955 (Idaho 1980). 
Dunn v. Ward, 670 P.2d 59, 62 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983). 
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summary judgment (#151 and #177). Defendants' various motions to strike are MOOT (#217; 
#228; #245), unless specifically addressed herein. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 13th day of February, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Paul G. fcassell 
United States District Judge 
45 
TabD 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION 
TRUGREEN COMPANIES, L L C , a 
Delaware limited liability company, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
v 
MOWER BROTHERS, INC , et al, 
Defendants 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No 1 06CV00024 
This second phase of summary judgment arguments requires the court to determine 
whether its prior order striking TruGreen's expert report and precluding the expert from 
testifying at trial necessitates dismissal of TruGreen's entire case against Defendants As an 
initial matter, the court finds that TruGreen has failed to provide any persuasive arguments as to 
why the court should reconsider its order striking Mr Elggren and thus DENIES TruGreen's 
motion to reconsider (#258) Moreover, the court GRANTS Defendants' motions to strike 
deposition exhibit 93 (#262) and strike and exclude lay or expert testimony of Mitchell Smith as 
to damages (#268) With this backdrop, the question becomes whether TruGreen has provided 
sufficient evidence of causation and damages from other sources to preclude summary judgment 
The court finds that, with respect to the Idaho claims, TruGreen has failed to provide sufficient 
evidence to preclude summary judgment under Idaho law 
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TruGreen contends that it has provided the court with sufficient evidence of causation 
and damages to support both a lost profits theory and an unjust enrichment theory of damages, 
even in the absence of Mr Elggren's expert report The unjust enrichment theory measures 
damages by the amount of defendant's profits, while the lost profits theory measures damages as 
the amount of profit lost to the plaintiff because of the breach TruGreen maintains that it can 
demonstrate that it was damaged by each defendant's alleged wrongful conduct by offering the 
testimony of TruGreen officers and upper management, who can testify as to TruGreen's 
business practices, their personal interactions with the defendants, and their observations on the 
decline of TruGreen's sales and the success of Mower Brothers At the very least, TruGreen 
argues that its potential entitlement to nominal damages precludes the court from disposing of the 
case on summary judgment 
Defendants argues that m the absence of Mr Elggren's report, there is no evidence in the 
summary judgment record from which a reasonable juror could estimate damages Defendants 
contend that TruGreen's proposed lay witnesses are not qualified to opme as to what alleged lost 
profits were sustained as a result of any of the Defendants' actions, including an inability to 
assess the various intervening causes that impact damages Moreover, even if these witnesses 
were qualified to provide damages testimony, Defendants assert that these witnesses' testimony 
still fails to demonstrate any damages caused by the Defendants Lastly, should TruGreen be 
entitled to nominal, and only nominal damages, Defendants assert that summary judgment would 
still be appropriate because they should not be burdened with a trial under such circumstances 
2 
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The court finds that TruGreen has failed to produce evidence that would raise a 
reasonable inference supporting causation and damages under a lost profits theory of damages 
TruGreen has failed to provide any admissible evidence that shows a causal connection between 
TruGreen's alleged damages and the alleged wrongful conduct of the Idaho defendants In 
arriving at this conclusion, the court only considered evidence in the summary judgment record -
a record that contains little actual testimony showing damages and causation The court finds 
that even if the lay witnesses identified by TruGreen are qualified to testify regarding damages, 
these witnesses' testimony fails to show how the Defendants' alleged wrongful conduct damaged 
TruGreen Because Idaho has expressly adopted a lost profits measure of damages for the claims 
at issue, the court finds it appropriate to grant summary judgment for Defendants on all of 
TruGreen's Idaho claims Finally, the court finds that TruGreen's potential entitlement to 
nominal damages does not preclude summary judgment because Idaho courts decline to remand 
cases for trial when a plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages and TruGreen's "non-monetary" 
reasons for proceeding to trial are unpersuasive 
With respect to the Utah claims, however, the court finds that no Utah court has expressly 
addressed the appropriate measure of damages for the Utah claims at issue in this case 
Consequently, the court will certify questions to the Utah Supreme Court regarding the proper 
measure of damages for the breach of an employment agreement, tortious interference with 
contractual and economic relationships, and violation of Utah's Unfair Competition Act 
3 
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Accordingly, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment - granting summary judgment for Defendants on all of TruGreen's Idaho 
claims. 
BACKGROUND 
In its summary judgment order dated February 13, 2007, the court addressed the parties' 
cross-claims for summary judgment as to all Defendants and as to all claims. The court denied 
TruGreen's motion for summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the court declined to grant summary judgment for 
the following defendants on the following claims: claims against Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van 
Acker, Roehr, Gaythwaite, and LeBlanc for breach of the non-competition covenant; claims 
against Mantz, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc and Stephensen for breach of the confidentiality provision; 
claims against Mantz, Gaythwaite, and Hiller for breach of non-interference provision; claims 
against Mower Brothers, Scotts, Greenside, Bitton, Babilis (collectively "Mower Brothers"), and 
Mantz, Hiller, and Gaythwaite for intentional interference with contractual relations; and claims 
against the Mower Brothers for intentional interference with economic relations and unfair 
competition. 
Also contained in the court's February 13th summary judgment order is a section on 
damages in which the court granted Defendants' motion to strike Mr. Elggren's expert report and 
preclude him from testifying at trial. The court directed the parties to brief the issue of whether 
the court's preclusion of damage testimony from Mr. Elggren should result in the entire case 
4 
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being dismissed In addition to the briefs explaining the parties' respective positions on the 
damages issues, the court received a motion to strike and exclude lay or expert testimony of 
Mitchell Smith as to damages, a motion to strike Deposition Exhibit 93 and all reference to 
Exhibit 93 in TruGreen's damages memorandum, and, a motion to reconsider the court's order 
striking Mr Elggren 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law "* In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the evidence and reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom should be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovmg 
party2 Because the heart of this motion regards the issue of damages, summary judgment will be 
denied if there is a genuine issue of fact from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the 
respective Defendants caused damage to TruGreen as a result of their alleged wrongful conduct3 
1
 Fed R Civ P Rule 56(c), Hutchinson v Pfeil, 105 F 3d 562, 564 (10th Cir 1997) 
(citing Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 U S 317,322(1986)) 
2
 Byers v City of Albuquerque, 150 F 3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir 1998) 
3
 See Walter v Stewart, 67 P 3d 1042, 1047 (Utah Ct App 2003) (declining to rule as a 
matter of law on a legal malpractice claim because a party produced evidence raising "a 
reasonable inference supporting both actual and proximate causation") 
5 
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DISCUSSION 
The court must determine whether its prior order striking Mr. Elggren's report and 
precluding him from testifying at trial necessitates dismissal of TruGreen's entire case against 
Defendants. The court finds that TruGreen has failed to produce evidence that would raise a 
reasonable inference supporting causation and damages under a lost profits theory of damages. 
Because Idaho has expressly adopted a lost profits measure of damages for the claims at issue, 
the court finds it appropriate to grant summary judgment for Defendants on all of TruGreen's 
Idaho claims. However, no Utah court has expressly addressed the proper measure of damages 
for the breach of an employment agreement, tortious interference with contractual and economic 
relationships, and violation of Utah's Unfair Competition Act. The court, therefore, withholds 
judgment on the Utah claims and will certify questions regarding these damages issues to the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
A. Analysis Under a Lost Profits Theory of Damages 
Although TruGreen seeks the application of an unjust enrichment measure of damages, it 
nevertheless contends that it has provided sufficient evidence of causation and damage to support 
a lost profits theory of damages. A lost profits measure of damages is the amount of profit lost to 
the plaintiff because of the breach, tortious interference, or unfair competition.4 TruGreen asserts 
that it can prove causation and damages under a lost profits theory through lay witness testimony 
and other evidence, even in the absence of Mr. Elggren's expert report. Specifically, TruGreen 
4
 See, e.g., Dunn v. Ward, 670 P.2d 59, 61 (Idahol983). 
6 
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maintains that it can demonstrate that it was damaged by Defendants' conduct by offering the 
testimony of TruGreen officers and upper management, who can testify as to TruGreen's 
business practices, their personal interactions with the Defendants, and their observations on the 
decline of TruGreen's sales and the success of Mower Brothers Also, TruGreen contends that 
these witnesses may offer testimony regarding (1) confidential information that has transferred 
into revenue gains for Defendants, (2) TruGreen's past financial performance, (3) TruGreen 
customers lost to Defendants, (4) the causal relationship between the employee defendants 
breach/departure and TruGreen's damages (including "Exhibit 93," which compares the total 
revenue generated by the defendants in 2005 with the 2006 revenue generated by newly hired 
employees), and (5) any other potential confounding cause of TruGreen's decreased sales m 
2006 At the very least, TruGreen argues that it is entitled to nominal damages should they 
prevail at trial on their breach of contract claims 
Defendants counter that in the absence of Mr Elggren's report, there is no evidence m 
the summary judgment record from which a reasonable juror could estimate damages 
Defendants argue that TruGreen's proposed lay witnesses are not qualified to opine as to what 
alleged lost profits were sustained as a result of any of the defendant's action, including an 
inability to assess the various intervening causes that impact damages Moreover, even if these 
witnesses were qualified to provide damages testimony, Defendants asserts that these witnesses' 
testimony still fails to demonstrate any damages caused by the Defendants Should TruGreen be 
entitled to nominal, and only nominal damages, Defendants maintain that summary judgment 
7 
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would still be appropriate because Defendants should not be burdened with a trial when there are 
only nominal damages available 
The court agrees with Defendants and finds that TruGreen has failed to provide the court 
with evidence that would raise a reasonable inference supporting causation and damages 
TruGreen has failed to provide any admissible evidence that shows a causal connection between 
TruGreen's alleged damages and the alleged wrongful conduct of the Defendants Even if the 
court were to consider (which it will not) what appears to be TruGreen's best possible evidence 
of damages - Mitchell Smith's testimony and his ability to testify as an expert, that TruGreen has 
not met its budgeted figures m 2006, and Exhibit 93 - this evidence still fails to show the 
requisite causal connection because (1) there is no testimony establishing that any of the 
Defendants were responsible for TruGreen's alleged failure to meet its 2006 budget, (2) a 
comparison of the employee defendants' 2005 sales with the 2006 sales of other new TruGreen 
employees does not show a relationship between TruGreen's alleged losses and Defendants' 
gains, and, (3) Mr Smith has not provided any evidence showing what damage is attributable to 
the Defendants remaining in this case In fact, TruGreen has failed to produce any evidence of 
what damage to TruGreen is attributable to any of the Defendants 
A critical problem with TruGreen's position is that it lacks support in the summary 
judgment documents As Defendants noted in their reply brief, "TruGreen merely recites the 
allQgcd foundation it intends to provide at trial for its lay witness testimony, without reciting 
actual testimony in the summary judgment record demonstrating what damages purportedly were 
8 
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caused by defendants."5 Specifically, TruGreen's identification of lay witness testimony and 
other evidence supporting its prima facie case - under the headings: specific items of 
misappropriated confidential information, TruGreen's past financial performance, TruGreen 
customers lost to [Mower Brothers], the causal relationship between the employee defendants 
breach/departure and TruGreen's damages, impact of hire dates on TruGreen's losses and 
Defendants' revenue gains, effect of the Ogden consolidation on TruGreen's damages, and any 
other potential confounding cause of TruGreen's decreased sales in 2006 - do not reference a 
potential calculation or measure of damages other than profit decreases by TruGreen and gains by 
Defendants. This is insufficient under a lost profits theory of damages. 
The court recognizes that calculating damages in these types of cases can be extremely 
difficult, and in its skillful briefing on this issue, TruGreen has cited many courts that have held 
such.6 But this difficulty does not excuse TruGreen from its obligation to provide reasonably 
specific damages calculations for each defendant when operating under a lost profits theory of 
damages - a theory expressly adopted by Idaho courts. 
In Dunn v. Ward, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that the "measure of damages for the 
breach of an anti-competition clause is the amount that the plaintiff lost by reason of the 
5
 Def.s' Reply Damages Mem. 3. 
6
 See, e.g., Nat'lMerch. Corp. v. Leyden, 348 N.E.2d 771 (Mass. 1976) (applying an 
unjust enrichment measure of damages in a non-competition case in part because of the difficulty 
of measuring damages under a lost profits theory). 
9 
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breach."7 The Dunn court erased any doubt as to the proper measure of damages for breach of 
anti-competition agreements in Idaho when it noted that a "plaintiff must prove that he was 
injured by the breach and show the amount of damage caused to him. The measure of damages 
is not the amount of profits made by the defendant, rather it is the amount of profit lost to the 
plaintiff because of the breach."8 Much like TruGreen, the plaintiff in Dunn "presented no 
evidence at all showing any loss of business, loss of customers or loss of profit to his own 
business attributable to [defendant's] breach. In addition, although [plaintiff] presented some 
proof of [defendant's] profits, he failed to show any relation between those profits and 
[plaintiffs] losses."9 Supporting a lost profits theory of damages for tortious interference claims, 
the Idaho Supreme Court noted that "in cases of tortious interference with an established 
business that damages for loss of anticipated earnings or profits must be shown with reasonable 
certainty."10 
Unfortunately for TruGreen, because Idaho courts have adopted a lost profits measure of 
damages for the relevant Idaho claims in this case, and because TruGreen has provided the court 
with no evidence that would raise a reasonable inference supporting causation and damages, the 
court finds it appropriate to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all Idaho claims 
7
 670 P.2d 59, 61 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983). 
"Id 
9
 Id. at 62. 
10
 Nora v. Safeco Ins. Co., 571 P.2d 347 (Idaho 1978) (internal quotations omitted). 
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under a lost profits standard. However, because TruGreen may be entitled to nominal damages, 
it argues that this court should allow it to nevertheless proceed to trial on its Idaho claims. The 
court disagrees. 
B. Potential Entitlement to Nominal Damages 
Having found that TruGreen has failed to produce sufficient evidence supporting 
causation and damages under a lost profits theory, the court turns its attention to the issue of 
whether the court should nevertheless allow TruGreen to proceed to trial on its Idaho claims. 
TruGreen asserts that it is entitled to proceed to trial on the merits even if it is only entitled to 
nominal damages because prevailing on its contract claims at trial would potentially result in the 
recovery of attorney fees and would allow TruGreen to vindicate its rights regarding the 
enforceability of its non-competition agreements. Defendants contend that an entitlement to 
nominal damages does not preclude summary judgment in their favor because Utah and Idaho 
courts consistently decline to remand cases if the damages are only nominal, and TruGreen 
should not be allowed to burden Defendants with a trial if only nominal damages are available. 
The court is persuaded that TruGreen's potential entitlement to nominal damages does 
not preclude summary judgment for the Defendants on all Idaho claims for the following three 
reasons. First, the court finds sufficient support under Idaho case law for the granting of 
summary judgment where there are only nominal damages available to the plaintiff.11 Second, 
11
 See Roemer v. Green Pastures Farms, Inc., 548 P.2d 857, 859 (Idaho 1976) 
("Assuming without deciding that the plaintiffs were entitled to nominal damages, we will not 
reverse 'for mere failure to allow nominal damages where, as here, the issue is one of damages 
l i 
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the court is not persuaded that a "victory" at trial for TruGreen on its contract claims will result 
in recovering its attorney fees under Idaho law.12 Third, TruGreen has asserted an interest in a 
"declaration from a court that its Employee Confidentiality/Non-Compete Agreement is 
enforceable as a matter of law."13 This argument for proceeding to trial is also unpersuasive to 
the court because (1) it is not clear whether a jury would find the facts necessary to hold the non-
competition agreements enforceable, and (2) any such finding by the jury would be limited to the 
facts of the individual employees. In other words, just because the "court" might conclude that 
the non-competition agreement was enforceable to a particular defendant in this case does not 
mean that the agreement would be enforceable for any other employee. Such a finding would 
have minimal precedential value. 
The court's decision on this issue is further supported by the defamation case Lamb v. 
Rizzo, in which the Tenth Circuit refused to remand a case for assessment of nominal damages 
because of the burden on the defendant of going to trial.14 Granted, the defendant in Lamb was 
alone.'") (citing Weaver v. Pacific Finance Loans, 487 P.2d 939, 941 (Idaho 1971)); Aim v. 
Johnson, 275 P.2d 959, 960 (Idaho 1954) ("Courts will not reverse a judgment for a defendant 
merely for the purpose of permitting the recovery of nominal damages where no question of costs 
and no important or substantial rights are involved."). 
12
 See Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(B) ("In determining which party to an action is a 
prevailing party and entitled to [attorney fees], the trial court shall in its sound discretion 
consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective 
parties."). 
13
 PL's Reply to Def.s' Damages Mem. at 17. 
14
 391 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2004). 
12 
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incapable of sustaining other harm - a "libel-proof plaintiff' - but the policy considerations 
remain the same. In addition to the burden on Defendants, the court is also sensitive to the 
burden placed on the citizens of this state that may be called for jury duty. TruGreen's potential 
entitlement to nominal damages does not preclude the court from granting summary judgment for 
Defendants on all remaining Idaho claims. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the court grants summary judgment for defendants 
Jason Hiller, James Clogston, Rick Deerfield, David Van Acker, and Tammy Roehr on all of 
TruGreen's claims against them; and the court grants summary judgment for defendants Mower 
Brothers, Scotts, Greenside, Bitton, and Babilis on all claims against them that arose in Idaho. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 8th day of June, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Paul G. Cassell 
United States District Judge 
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